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BALANCING THE “ZONING BUDGET”
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ABSTRACT
The politics of urban land use frustrate even the best intentions. A
number of cities have made strong political commitments to
increasing their local housing supply in the face of a crisis of
affordability and availability in urban housing. However decisions to
engage in “up-zoning,” or increasing the areas in which new housing
can be built, are often offset by even more “down-zoning,” laws that
decrease the ability of residents in a designated area to build new
housing as-of-right. The result is that housing availability does not
increase by anywhere near the amount that elected officials promised.
In this Article, we argue that the difficulty cities face in increasing
local housing supply is a result of the seriatim nature of local landuse decisions. Because each down-zoning decision has only a small
effect on the housing supply, citywide forces spend little political
capital fighting them, leaving the field to neighborhood groups who
care deeply. Further, because down-zoning decisions are made in
advance of any proposed new development, the most active interest
group in favor of new housing—developers—takes a pass on
lobbying. The result is an uneven playing field that favors downzoning.
Drawing on examples of “extra-congressional procedure” like the
federal base closing commissions and the Reciprocal Trade Act of
1933, we argue that local governments can solve this problem by
changing the procedure by which they consider zoning decisions.
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Specifically, they should pass laws that require the city to create a
local “zoning budget” each year. All deviations downward from
planned growth in housing supply expressed in the budget should
have to be offset by corresponding increases elsewhere in buildable
as-of-right land. This would reduce the degree to which universal
logrolling coalitions can form among anti-development neighborhood
groups. And the policy would create incentives for pro-development
forces to lobby against down-zonings in which they currently have
little interest. The result should yield a housing policy that more
closely tracks local housing-development preferences.
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INTRODUCTION
Sometimes seemingly minute events can reveal important truths.
October 28, 2009 was a minor benchmark in New York City’s recent
zoning history: the New York City Council approved the one
hundredth re-zoning of Mayor Bloomberg’s administration. 1 Initiated
by the City’s Planning Department at the request of the residents of a
Brooklyn neighborhood known as “Carroll Gardens,” 2 the re-zoning
plan encompassed eighty-six blocks of three- to four-story row houses
interspersed with some four- and five-story multi-family apartment
buildings. Under the existing rules, owners of lots with the extra-long
front yards common in the neighborhood could have built houses up
to seventy feet high. 3 But seventy-foot structures would have towered
above the fifty-foot high row houses currently occupying the parcels.
Spurred by neighbors’ complaints about such “pop-up”
developments, 4 the City Planning Commission recommended that the
area be down-zoned to prevent such building, insuring that new
1 Statement of Mayor Michael R. Bloomberg on City Planning’s 100th Re-Zoning Plan
Adopted Under Bloomberg Administration, N.Y. CITY DEP’T OF CITY PLAN.,
http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/html/about/pr102809.shtml (Oct. 28, 2009).
2 Carroll Gardens/Columbia Street Rezoning, N.Y.C. DEP’T OF CITY PLANNING,
http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/html/carroll_columbia/index.shtml (last visited Sept. 30, 2011).
For a map of the area and a visual depiction of the rezoning, see Carroll Gardens/Columbia
Street Rezoning Land Use and Existing Zoning Map, N.Y. CITY DEP’T OF CITY PLAN.,
http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/pdf/carroll_columbia/existing_zoning_landuse.pdf (last visited
Oct. 30, 2011).
3 Under an 1846 Brooklyn ordinance, row houses on certain streets had to extend thirtythree feet five and a quarter inches in front of the buildings, allowing for the creation of an oasis
of elaborate gardens sporting patches of lawn, flower beds, soaring trees, and, during the
Christmas season, elaborate light displays. Gregory Beyer, The Big Front Yards That Rob the
Streets, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 2008, at CY6. With respect to these lots, the zoning rules are a bit
more complicated than merely mandating specific height limits. Under the existing “R6”
zoning, extra-large setbacks allowed owners to build structures up to seventy feet high with a
“floor-area ratio” of up to three. See id. (noting that the proposed down-zoning would reduce the
seventy foot limit to fifty-five). “Floor-area ratio” or “FAR” measures the total floor area in
relationship to the area of the underlying lot. A one-story building that covers the entire lot has a
FAR of one. Likewise, a two-story building that covers fifty percent of the lot has a FAR of one.
A FAR of three entitles the owner to build a three-story building covering the entire lot.
4 See CG CORD/CARROLL GARDENS COALITION FOR RESPECTFUL DEVELOPMENT,
http://carrollgardenspetition.blogspot.com (last visited Oct. 30, 2011) (providing summary of
campaign against the new development, copy of and link to a petition, and blog posts). For an
example of neighbors’ complaints about the out-of-context buildings, see Robert, Carroll
Gardens
Hell
Building
Still
Hellish,
CURBED
(Oct.
31,
2008),
http://ny.curbed.com/archives/2008/10/31/carroll_gardens_hell_building_still_hellish.php (“It’s
like a tumor . . . it’s just an ugly thing.”); see also Carol Gardens Hell Building, CURBED,
http://ny.curbed.com/tags/carroll-gardens-hell-building (last visited Oct. 30, 2011) (extensive
coverage of controversy regarding the building at 333 Carroll Street dubbed “Carroll Gardens
Hell Building” by residents and bloggers).
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construction would be “more consistent with the existing scale of
th[e] neighborhood.” 5
The interest of Carroll Gardens’ re-zoning is easy to miss, because
the moral of the story lies in what was left unsaid by the city’s landuse authorities. During the entire lengthy process, no one calculated—
or even mentioned—the potential housing units lost because of the
down-zoning. 6 This omission was especially odd because the affected
sites were prime locations for housing. The lots are only a few blocks
from the F and G subway lines leading to Manhattan and Queens, are
close to retail, and are already occupied by sound residential
structures that needed only to be enlarged rather than demolished to
accommodate additional occupants.
Yet the participants at the various hearings all ignored the need for
housing, supporting the proposed re-zoning solely because it would
preserve existing neighborhood character. The community board
representing the neighbors requested further down-zoning to keep all
buildings in the area at a height of fifty feet, even those fronting on
major thoroughfares. 7 The City Planning Commission report was
likewise silent on the question of preserving opportunities for
housing. 8 And the New York City Council voted unanimously to
approve the change without a word about housing supply. 9
That New York City would down-zone prime residential land
without any comment on the consequent loss of housing opportunities
is extremely strange given the state of citywide politics. Mayor
Michael Bloomberg proposed a long-term plan for New York City—
“PlaNYC 2030”—prior to his 2009 reelection that called for the
creation of 265,000 new units of housing by 2030 to accommodate an
5 City Planning Comm’n, In the Matter of an Application Submitted by the Department of
City Planning Pursuant to Sections 197–c and 201 of the New York City Charter for an
Amendment of the Zoning Map, Section Nos. 16a & 16c, N.Y. CITY DEP’T OF CITY PLAN. (Sept.
23, 2009), at 18, available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/pdf/cpc/090462.pdf.
6 For the New York City Planning Commission’s report, see id.
7 For an account of the hearing, including videos of the interested parties’ testimony, see
Katia Kelly, Carroll Gardeners Urge NYC Planning Commission to Re-Think R6A Zoning
Pockets,
PARDON
ME
FOR
ASKING,
Aug.
19,
2009,
http://pardonmeforasking.blogspot.com/2009/08/carroll-gardeners-urge-nyc-zoning.html. For a
summary of Community Board Six’s recommendations, see Letter from Richard S. Bashner,
Community Board 6 Chairperson, to Amanda Burden, Chairperson of the New York
Department
of
Planning
(July
13,
2009),
available
at
http://www.brooklyncb6.org/_attachments/2009%2D07%2D13%20CGCS%20Rezoning%20Re
solution%2Edoc.
8 See supra note 5 and accompanying text (discussing the lack of discussion in the
planning commission’s report).
9 See Council Takes Action to Prevent Foreclosure Consultants from Cheating New York
City
Property
Owners,
N.Y.
City
COUNCIL
(Oct.
28,
2009),
http://council.nyc.gov/html/releases/prestated_10_28_09.shtml (discussing the council’s vote on
numerous topics including the Carroll Gardens rezoning).
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estimated one million new residents. 10 It is safe to say that the
Bloomberg Administration, and the city that elected him, have made a
political commitment to increasing the supply of housing. The
Bloomberg Administration’s policy choice responds to the high cost
of housing in New York City, with the average apartment in
Manhattan costing $1.3 million in 2010, even after the housing crisis,
and the average citywide costing $854,000.11
However strange, down-zoning prime residential land without
considering the effect on the housing supply is not anomalous. 59
percent of the Bloomberg Administration’s down-zonings have
eliminated housing in areas served by mass transit.12 And a
disproportionate number of the down-zonings have eliminated
housing densities in seemingly high-demand neighborhoods, as well
as in neighborhoods with lots of “soft” sites, where new construction
would be the least expensive. 13 None of the down-zonings seem to be
accompanied by any conscious or systematic effort to provide
counterbalancing up-zonings. 14 New York City’s Environmental
Quality Review does not require any assessment of housing lost as a
result of a down-zoning; the technical manual is silent on the topic, 15
10 MAYOR MICHAEL R. BLOOMBERG, CITY OF NEW YORK, PLANYC: A GREENER,
GREATER
NEW
YORK
12
(2007),
available
at
http://nytelecom.vo.llnwd.net/o15/agencies/planyc2030/pdf/full_report_2007.pdf.
11 Press Release, Real Estate Board of New York, NYC Housing Market Continues to
Rebound in 3rd Quarter (Oct. 12, 2010), available at http://www.marketwire.com/pressrelease/NYC-Housing-Market-Continues-Rebound-in-3rd-Quarter-1333276.htm.
12 Amy Armstrong et al., How Have Recent Rezonings Affected the City’s Ability to
Grow?, FURMAN CTR. FOR REAL EST. & URB. POL’Y, (Mar. 2010), at 11,
http://furmancenter.org/files/publications/Rezonings_Furman_Center_Policy_Brief_March_201
0.pdf.
13 Id. at 14. There is some weak evidence that the effects of up- and down-zonings may
cancel each other out roughly, but in the face of a citywide policy to drastically increase the
housing stock, this is weak tea. Between 2003 and 2007, city-initiated re-zonings—that is,
zonings that tend to be large-scale and comprehensive—affected about 188,000 lots citywide, or
about eighteen percent of the New York City’s total land area. Amy Armstrong et al., State of
New York City’s Housing and Neighborhoods 2009, FURMAN CTR. FOR REAL EST. & URB.
POL’Y, 27–28, http://furmancenter.org/files/sotc/SOC_2009_Full.pdf. The Furman Center
estimated that the net effect of these re-zonings was to increase the City’s total residential
development capacity “on paper” by about 1.7%, which added “enough space, at least ‘on
paper,’ for about 80,000 new units or 200,000 new residents.” Armstrong, supra note 12, at 8.
14 From 2002 to October 2005, “42 re-zonings ’to preserve neighborhood character’” had
taken place involving over 3,600 blocks. Janny Scott, In a Still-Growing City, Some
Neighborhoods Say Slow Down, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 2005, at B1. Most of these down-zonings
have not been consciously accompanied by increases in densities nearby, and the city’s
regulations for re-zoning require no such balancing of zoning decisions.
15 See N.Y.C. MAYOR’S OFFICE OF ENVTL. COORDINATION, CITY ENVIRONMENTAL
QUALITY REVIEW TECHNICAL MANUAL (2011) 4–1 to 4–30, available at
http://www.nyc.gov/html/oec/html/ceqr/technical_manual.shtml (describing New York City’s
“Land Use, Zoning, and Public Policy”); id. at 5–1–5–29 (describing the “Socioeconomic
Conditions” of New York City, including “its population, housing, and economic activity”). The
Manual devotes several pages to discussing assessment of “displacement” of “existing
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and existing Environmental Impact Statements issued by the city do
not discuss the issue except in the vaguest of terms. 16
Why do city decision-makers ignore down-zonings’ impact on
housing supply? This Article is an effort to provide an answer to this
question. It argues that this neglect of housing need is not an accident,
but a consequence of a system of seriatim zoning decisions, which
creates incentives for both neighbors and their elected representatives
to impose excessive restrictions on the housing supply. On any given
zoning vote, the supporters of restrictive zoning have an advantage
over the supporters of additional housing supply even when most city
residents prefer a less restrictive zoning policy. Because land-use
regulation procedure causes them to ignore the long-term effects of
their individual zoning decisions, local governments impose
restrictions in excess of what their own planners and politicians
declare to be the optimal amount of regulation.
We examine the reasons for zoning’s over-use in Part I. The
essence of the problem is that the neighbors who are physically close
to parcels proposed for additional housing generally have strong
incentives and organizational capacity to oppose changes in the
zoning status quo. They are a paradigmatic “Olsonian interest
group”—a group of people with a large stake in a decision’s outcome
and with physical ties to each other that reduce the costs of
networking and collective action.17 By contrast, the persons benefited
by proposals for additional housing are dispersed and disorganized.
Further, for many projects, like the Carroll Gardens down-zoning,
members of the one powerful interest in favor of new construction—
city-wide developers—individually have little interest in paying for
political opposition to down-zonings. Each developer is unsure
whether she or some other developer will be selected by the current
owner to develop the lots. It is hardly a surprise, therefore, that the
neighbors beat the developers in lobbying the relevant land-use
decision-makers about neighborhood-initiated down-zonings.

residents” by escalating rents resulting from new construction. Id. But the Manual is silent on
the possibility that residents could be displaced by barriers to the construction of new housing.
16 See, e.g., City Planning Comm’n, Final Environmental Impact Statement for the
Proposed Manhattanville in West Harlem Rezoning and Academic Mixed-use Development,
N.Y. CITY DEP’T OF CITY PLAN. (Nov. 16, 2007), at 4–2 to 4–3,
http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/html/env_review/manhattanville.shtml (discussing the direct
displacement of residents and noting that an estimated 238 residents would be displaces, but
concluding that “the number and types of people displaced would not be enough to alter
neighborhood character”).
17 See infra note 27 and accompanying text (discussing Mancur Olson’s theory).
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The structure of land-use decision making lacks effective
mechanisms by which the local government’s general interest in
housing can be given appropriate weight. In theory, the local
legislature—city council, township board, county commission, etc.—
should reflect the interests of constituencies other than the relatively
small group of people directly affected by nearby construction. In
practice, however, local political parties tend to be too weak or
unconnected to local issues to make policy issues a matter of contest
in local elections. 18 Instead, city council members cultivate the
“personal vote” by engaging in non-policy oriented casework: 19
fixing potholes, seeking extra pork spending for their district, and
generally fielding neighborhood complaints. In that environment,
each legislator has incentives to defer to every other legislator’s
interests in excluding unwanted developments, with the consequence
that the general interest in new housing—the “zoning budget”—tends
to be slighted.
In theory, elected officials or policy experts with city- or countywide jurisdiction could take on the task of protecting the local
governments’ general interest in housing. (Mayor Bloomberg’s
“PlaNYC 2030” is an effort in this direction.) But such officials are
best suited for defining the general needs of the jurisdiction, not for
allocating the land uses that serve those needs among different
competing neighborhoods. The latter task requires sensitivity to the
intensity of neighbors’ objections to a proposed use, not only an
overall view of what is good for the whole jurisdiction. Further,
legislators are unlikely to trust that central planning authorities will
take their concerns into account sufficiently and hence will not agree
to delegate to them the power to make land-use decisions. In short,
local legislatures are too decentralized and parochial to be interested
in the general housing supply, while citywide officials tend to be too
aloof and remote from neighborhood concerns to know how to
allocate land uses among affected neighborhoods.
How can legislators be forced to avoid the tyranny of small
decisions that whittle away the supply of buildable land for housing?
In Part II, we argue that combining multiple decisions into a single
package subject only to an up-or-down vote can help achieve an
efficient land-use policy. We illustrate the benefits of bundling such
18 See infra notes 48–53 and accompanying text (discussing how the lack of a “party
brand” in local politics leads to interest group domination).
19 See BRUCE CAIN, JOHN FEREJOHN & MORRIS FIORINA, THE PERSONAL VOTE 57–63
(1987) (defining casework as “the provision of information and assistance to constituents who
have problems” and documenting the nature of the casework done by members of Congress and
Parliament, including in one instance, the repair of a toaster).
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legislative procedures with the examples of Congress’ closing
obsolete military bases and ratifying reciprocal tariff agreements. 20 In
both of those examples, Congress delegated to an extra-legislative
agency (a base-closing commission and the President respectively)
the task of packing together decisions on multiple issues, with
Congress reserving for itself only the power to ratify the entire
package without amendments.
This extra-legislative packaging of issues has one (or both) of two
distinct benefits. First, in the case of the base-closings, the procedure
reduced incentives for each member of Congress to save their own
military base through log-rolling by assuring them that they would
not be left out of a majority coalition seeking to increase their own
share of money saved from base-closings. We call this benefit the
“cost-spreading” advantage of extra-legislative issue-bundling.
Second, in the case of reciprocal tariff agreements, the “fast-track”
procedure bundled together reductions of both foreign and domestic
tariffs, thereby recruiting exporters to fight against and neutralize
protectionist constituencies who might otherwise defeat the treaty.
We call this benefit the “conflict-inducing” advantage of extralegislative issue bundling.
In Part III, we explore whether similar mechanisms can be used to
overcome neighborhood opposition to new housing. Part III.A shows
that two land-use regulatory procedures bear a close analogy to the
base-closing commissions and the “fast track” ratification of trade
treaties. First, existing “fair share” systems for allocating affordable
housing or other locally unwanted land uses (“LULUs” in land-use
speak) among local governments or neighborhoods is a version of
“cost-spreading” issue-bundling closely analogous to the base-closing
commissions. By relieving each legislator’s fear that her district will
be the dumping ground for LULUs that other jurisdictions avoid, the
cost-spreading bundle reduces each legislator’s incentives to roll logs
to fight off all LULUs whatsoever. Second, zoning rules could create
“conflict inducing benefits” if they required down-zonings to be
matched with up-zonings. That system would closely resemble
reciprocal trade treaties that bundle foreign and domestic tariff
reductions because it would enlist neighborhoods targeted for upzonings to resist rival neighborhoods’ regulatory efforts to restrict
housing with down-zonings.

20 See infra notes 63–81 and accompanying text (discussing obsolete military base
closings); infra notes 82–111 and accompanying text (discussing Congress’s delegation of
power to the President for the purpose of trade negotiations).
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In Part III.B, we conclude with a tentative exploration of how the
latter sort of “conflict-inducing” bundling procedure might be refined
to insure that down-zonings and up-zonings are not uncoupled by the
legislature. By delegating to the Planning Commission the task of
tying together up- and down-zoning changes, zoning procedure could
markedly increase the costs for city council members to defect from
the procedure to keep up-zonings out of their district. The
peculiarities of land-use law also offer opportunities for state courts to
help entrench the coupling of up- and down-zonings.
We offer this “coupling mechanism” as a heuristic rather than a
strict recipe. The important point is that it provides a method for
pitting geographically concentrated interest groups against each other
in ways that it would be difficult for a legislature to undo. In urban
legislatures, where political party competition is weak, legislative
procedure can balance specific interest groups and force legislatures
to consider more general interests. Reform efforts inside cities should
focus on changing the politics of urban land use when they have the
opportunity, rather than making one-time policy changes that will be
whittled away over time.
I. THE PUBLIC CHOICE OF LAND-USE DECISIONS
This Article’s central claim is that the method cities use to make
land-use decisions has a systematic bias towards excessively
protecting incumbent land users against new entrants, particularly in
high-value housing areas. Specifically, seriatim decision making in
local legislatures that are non-partisan or dominated by one party
increases the likelihood that legislators will form universal log-rolling
coalitions, with individual legislators ending up with outsized
influence over land use decisions in their districts. This gives current
homeowners the ability to leverage their ability to organize, physical
proximity and greater individual interest in the outcome into
excessive restrictions on housing development.
This Section discusses the sources of this systematic bias. It first
explains the natural political benefits that incumbent homeowners
have over their opponents—renters, future buyers, and developers—
in the land-use wars. Second, it discusses why the usual protection for
more dispersed interests in legislatures, the interest of the governing
party in maintaining the quality of its party brand, does not exist in
most local legislatures, leaving decision making more dependent on
the strength of particular interest groups. Finally, it argues that
delegating land-use decisions to an official with jurisdiction over the
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entire local government like a mayor or planning commission would
not be effective.
A. An Unfair Fight: Geographically Concentrated Opposition and
Interest Group Misalignment
The parties in virtually all land use disputes are the same. On one
side are incumbent property owners seeking to limit or stop new
development. On the other are renters, future residents and, crucially,
developers. When zoning decisions are made seriatim, and
particularly where individual developers have no existing interest in
down-zoned land, the fight is hardly fair, both for some pretty
obvious, and some less obvious, reasons. The benefits of new
development are dispersed, both geographically and across many
individuals. In contrast, the harms are concentrated in a specific
geographic area of the development, and on individuals who have a
great deal invested in the outcome of land use decisions. For many
local governments, this disparity in the costs of political organization
can result in excessive limitations on new housing.
That land use disputes involve geographically concentrated harms
and geographically dispersed benefits should be clear. Virtually all of
the terms used in debates about land use—Not in My Back Yard
(NIMBY), Locally Unwanted Land Uses (LULU), etc.—are premised
on the idea that there are many types of land use to which people do
not object appearing somewhere, as long as they do not appear near
themselves. 21
While the aversion to LULUs is easy to see in the case of homeless
shelters or garbage disposal facilities, it is equally true of ordinary
housing like apartment buildings and “granny flats.” 22 A new
apartment building, for instance, provides benefits to consumers of
housing, both buyers and renters, as prices will fall and quality will
rise if supply is allowed to match demand, particularly in the specific
locations desired by those consumers. 23 But any proposed project will
21 See Vicki Been, What’s Fairness Got To Do With It?: Environmental Justice and the
Siting of Locally Undesirable Land Uses, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 1001, 1006 (1993) (exploring
the evidence of disproportionate siting of locally unwanted land uses in predominantly
disadvantaged neighborhoods, arguing such results are unfair, and examining legislative
strategies to combat the problem).
22 A “granny flat” is an apartment built atop an existing structure for the purpose of
housing a different household, like a grandmother. See Janny Scott, The Apartment Atop the
Garage Is Back in Vogue, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2006, at A1 (discussing a resurgence in the
popularity of “granny flats”). The “pop-up” developments in the Carroll Gardens area that were
barred by the down-zoning discussed in the introduction likely would have included a number
of granny flats.
23 As we discuss below, one of the central pro-zoning arguments relies on an assumption
that housing or other building in a region is roughly fungible, that down-zoning one area is not a
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only provide small benefits to each prospective consumer of housing,
as each new apartment or house will only have a marginal effect on
the price. By contrast, there is usually a class of geographically
concentrated residents who will be made substantially worse off.
Homeowners in the neighborhood of a development may see fewer
scenic views, increased shadow, more traffic and less parking, more
children in their school’s catchment area, 24 or simply more people
when they would rather see fewer. 25 More importantly, they will see
more competition for buyers and renters of housing, as the amount of
homes in their neighborhood—which, for most homeowners, is their
largest asset by a huge margin—becomes less scarce. 26

bad result if the housing can go elsewhere. See infra note 25 and accompanying text (discussing
the basis for the pro-zoning argument).
For instance, this argument is raised in defense of the severe height limit on buildings in
the District of Columbia, which restricts buildings from growing any higher than twenty feet
taller than the width of the street it faces. D.C. CODE § 6–601.05(a) (2011). Supporters of the
restriction suggest that buildings downtown or in high-priced areas do not need to be able to go
higher because there are plenty of underused lots elsewhere in the city. See e.g., Paul
Schwartzman, High-Level Debate On Future of D.C., WASH. POST, May 2, 2007, at B1 (quoting
the Director of the National Capital Planning Commission to this effect). However, this ignores
the logic of the property market. Consumers of housing and commercial tenants locate in
specific places for specific reasons, making restrictions in those places costly even if there is
other available housing or office space. For consumers of housing, an apartment in, say, Dupont
Circle is not a substitute for an apartment in Brooklyn, nor is an office on K Street easily
replicable with an office in residential upper Northwest.
Modern agglomeration economics has shown that there are benefits to businesses and
residents that come from being close to other businesses and residents, such as information
spillovers or cultural amenities, which are reflected in both housing prices and wages. See David
Schleicher, The City as a Law and Economic Subject, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1507, 1515–29
(arguing that benefits of proximity explain urbanization tendencies that are unexplained by
neoclassical economic models). Moving from one’s ideal location to some other location entails
costs. Forcing development away from certain areas and into others is a tax, and an onerous one
at that.
24 See, e.g., S. Jhoanna Robledo, Catchment-22, NEW YORK, Dec. 3, 2007, at 27
(describing opposition to development from parents of children in the same catchment area for a
local school).
25 Further, if the area constitutes a political subdivision of any sort, neighborhood
residents also may see lower per capita tax revenues, which may lead them to oppose
developments that have no other direct effect on them. As Bruce Hamilton has shown, local
governments need to limit their population in order for movement around a region in search of
public policies to achieve stability. See Bruce W. Hamilton, Zoning and Property Taxation in a
System of Local Governments, 12 URB. STUD. 205, 208 (1975) (discussing the optimal number
of households in a giving community). If a local government uses property taxes and is a hightax, high service location, property owners will subdivide their property so that residents can
live on cheaper than average parcels yet still consume local services at the average rate. A
smaller version can happen inside a single government: neighborhoods have a strong interest in
allowing new development in the catchment area of their local schools, as it can result in
overcrowding.
26 To the extent that all residents in a neighborhood are willing and able to increase
housing supply on their own properties, a down-zoning will not provide a benefit to them, as it
will reduce each owner’s ability to develop their property to meet the demand for housing.
However, to the extent there are common pool resources—streets, schools, sunlight—reducing
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As Mancur Olson famously argued, smaller groups facing lower
organizing costs and higher payoffs from political success will have
an easier time overcoming the collective action problems that inhibit
political activity. 27 And the situation of homeowners’ abutting a
proposed residential development presents an Olsonian perfect storm.
Homeowners are easy to organize because they are physically close
together and thus easy to monitor. Moreover, to the extent that the
neighbors are also owner-occupiers of their structure, their large and
undiversified investment in their home encourages political activity to
protect their investment from harmful neighborhood change. 28 The
beneficiaries of development are theoretical, distant or easy to
caricature—rambunctious young new residents and fat-cat
developers. Anyone who has been to a community board meeting
understands the physical embodiment of this phenomenon, a host of
local residents screaming at a developer’s representative for hours and
hours on end with little dissent.
The geographically concentrated nature of the harms is a
frequently discussed aspect of land-use disputes. Less frequently
discussed is the issue of interest group alignment. Housing
development disputes differ from ordinary LULU fights in one
important respect. Virtually all residents other than those near the
intended site of a LULU will be happy—everyone in a city wants a
garbage treatment plant somewhere, just not in their neighborhood.
But it is not always the case that homeowners in one part of a city will
be happy with an apartment tower going up in someone else’s
neighborhood. After all, to the extent that their homes serve as even

competition for access to them does provide a benefit. Further, to the extent that homeowners do
not want to expand development on their properties (either for taste reasons or because they are
already at the current zoning limit), localized residents benefit from restricting development
nearby and hence limiting supply. We would like to thank Bruce Johnsen for suggesting this
caveat to our general point.
27 See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 33–36 (2d ed. 1971) (“[I]n
some small groups . . . there are members who would be better off if the collective good were
provided, even if they had to pay the entire cost of providing it themselves, than they would be
if it were not provided. . . . [S]mall groups . . . may very well be able to provide themselves with
a collective good simply because of the attraction of the collective good to the individual
members. In this, small groups differ from larger ones. The larger the group is, the farther it will
fall short of obtaining an optimal supply of any collective good . . . .”).
28 As William Fischel has argued, the intense interest of homeowners in local politics
makes small local governments correspondingly responsive to their concerns. See WILLIAM A.
FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS 3–5 (2001) (“The reason that local governments
perform better is that the benefits and costs of local decision making are reflected in the value of
property in the jurisdiction. . . . Homeowners are acutely aware that local amenities, public
services, and taxes affect . . . the value of the largest single asset they own. As a result, they pay
much closer attention to such policies at the local level than they would at the state or national
level.”).

1/5/2012 1:33:09 PM

2011]

BALANCING THE “ZONING BUDGET”

93

rough substitutes for homes in other neighborhoods, homeowners
across a city or region benefit from restrictions on housing supply.
Restrictive zoning rules provide benefits to all current homeowners,
just as any other supply restriction provides benefits to holders of an
artificially scarce asset. To the extent that homeowners citywide are
easier to mobilize than non-home owning consumers or potential
consumers of new housing (e.g., renters and prospective buyers), this
stacks the deck even more against new development.
Against this widely shared harm, however, there stands an interest
group who can stand in for consumers of housing—developers. When
the dispute is about a proposed up-zoning or approval for a new
project, developers—who are among the biggest players in local
politics—will fight neighborhood groups, sometimes winning and
sometimes losing. By contrast, developers individually have little
interest in fighting down-zonings in neighborhoods where they have
not yet purchased any real estate interest. 29 If the down-zoning is
defeated, any developer can swoop in and buy properties in the area
regardless of whether they participated in that defeat, creating an
incentive to free ride on someone else’s lobbying activity. Because
zoning decisions are made seriatim, developers have little incentive to
get involved in projects where they have no skin in the game yet,
splitting the pro-development coalition between developers and
renters/buyers.
While up-zonings have at least some powerful interest group
support, the opposition to down-zoning comes from a theory—the
idea that excessively restricting supply in the face of strong demand is
costly. And naked theories, unadorned by powerful groups with
individually valuable interests, fare poorly in the rough and tumble of
urban politics.
Other interest groups face similar collective action problems and
hence do not fight down-zonings. Higher housing prices affect the
ability of employers to attract quality employees, but each project has
a small effect on the labor market generally, never mind any given
employer’s ability to find talented employees. Further, employers can
draw their workforce from across a region, as people can commute,
making investment in any one city’s land-use decisions even less
likely. It is hard to see urban employers, or anyone else, emerging as
a strong voice against excessive down-zoning.
Put together, the interests involved in many local land-use disputes
are horribly unbalanced, between people who are well-equipped to
29 Developers who continue to own property benefit like other property holders from
zoning restrictions. However, they are already involved in restricting development as a result.
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protect their specific investments against mobile residents and
developers who are each harmed only a little by most land-use
decisions. It is not surprising, therefore, that down-zoning efforts
often frustrate efforts to build increase the local housing supply.
Does this imbalance lead to an inefficiently low level of housing?
In theory, developers could simply bribe the neighbors into accepting
greater housing density in their neighborhood whenever they actually
wanted to build. “Community benefits agreements” under which
developers promise various public amenities—jobs in the proposed
development, playgrounds, affordable housing, etc.—are a practical
way in which developers can insure that local opposition does not
thwart cost-justified residential development. 30 Such “sale” of
development rights by neighborhoods could result in the efficient
balancing of development-imposed congestion costs against the value
of new housing. A neighborhood or local government’s control over
zoning decisions, as William Fischel and Robert Nelson have
brilliantly argued, serves as a “collective property right” on behalf of
current homeowners, serving to ensure that local property values are
enhanced, or at least not reduced, by new development. 31
However, neighborhoods will disregard the effect denying a
project will have on the overall cost of housing citywide. Giving
neighborhoods the power to make zoning decisions can serve to
displace development from its most efficient location (e.g., moving
housing away from subway lines, or moving firms away from their
suppliers). That displacement generally forces development to spread
out unnaturally, reducing the efficiency of “agglomeration
economies,” or the economic gains that residents get from being near
one another.32 Local development problems are similar to the regional
30 See generally Vicki Been, Community Benefits Agreements: A New Local Government
Tool or Another Variation on the Exactions Theme? 3 (Furman Ctr. for Real Est. & Urb. Pol.,
Working
Paper,
Apr.
2010)
(unpublished
manuscript),
available
at
http://furmancenter.org/files/publications/Community_Benefits_Agreements_Working_Paper.p
df (discussing the legal and policy questions presented by community benefit agreement’s and
their effects on various stakeholders).
31 Fischel and Nelson argue that local governments’ negotiations with developers will, for
Coasean reasons, result in the same amount of development as would have occurred otherwise.
See WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMICS OF ZONING LAWS 125–49 (1985) (examining
several reasons why suburban zoning may be too restrictive); ROBERT H. NELSON, ZONING AND
PROPERTY RIGHTS 22–51 (1977) (describing local zoning regulation as creating a collective
property right.).
32 While Fischel’s argument might hold true for an individual town or neighborhood,
when all communities impose a charge for the right to develop, then the collective charges
function much like a tax on new development. Further, this local protectionism functions to
displace development from its ideal location in a region, reducing the efficiency of
agglomeration economies. Unless location is fungible (that is, town A is identical to town B)
and there are an infinite number of localities in a region, local control over property
development will lead to excessive growth outwards, increase the cost of housing, and reduce
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problem of competitive “exclusionary zoning.” But a crucial
difference is that internal limitations on development do not promote
sorting among governments based on preferences about local public
services. 33 Further, there is also the equity-based objection that
neighbors ought not to be able to extract rents from newcomers and
developers simply because they happen to reside in a neighborhood
where the demand for new homes is high.
The regional effects of zoning restrictions on new housing can be
quite large. Ed Glaeser, Joe Gyorko, and Raven Saks have estimated
that, for instance, zoning restrictions are responsible for almost half of
the cost of homes in the San Francisco region. 34 For a city like New
York that itself covers a huge housing market, the cost effects can be
dramatic: zoning restrictions increase the cost of housing in
Manhattan by nearly 50 percent. 35 Although it is difficult to get an
exact measure of the net benefits of zoning restriction for cost-benefit
analysis purposes, 36 there is a great deal of evidence that
neighborhood dominance of land use produces substantial costs.

the efficiency of agglomeration economies. Schleicher, supra note 23, at 1540–45.
33 Zoning restrictions are essential to the process of sorting under the well-known Tiebout
Model. The Tiebout Model shows that where individuals make location decision based on
available packages of public policies, they sort themselves among local governments, which
results in the efficient provision of local governmental services. See Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure
Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416, 418 (1956) (“[T]he consumer-voter moves
to that community whose local government best satisfies his set of preferences. The greater the
number of communities and the greater the variance among them, the closer the consumer will
come to fully realizing his preference position.”).
However, as Bruce Hamilton has shown, the Tiebout Model does not produce an
equilibrium if local governments are funded through property taxes unless cities can limit their
population using zoning. Hamilton, supra note 25, at 211. The reason is that in any high
tax/high service local government, there will be an incentive for property holders to subdivide
their property, as it would allow more residents to consume local services but pay less in taxes.
Id. Without zoning, new residents will just chase high services areas until their entry breaks
down the ability of the local government to pay for the high services. Zoning permits cities to
limit their population and hence permits there to be an equilibrium in the Tiebout Model. Id.
This does not change the cost side of zoning—it still displaces development from its best
location—but it does add an extra benefit when the competition is between towns and not
between neighborhoods inside a city. See Schleicher, supra note 23, at 1534 (“Agglomeration
gains . . . are not felt exclusively, or even primarily, within local government boundaries. . . .
[W]e care not only about what is very near to us, but also what is within the bands of distance
from us—what is in the next town over . . . .”).
34 Edward L. Glaeser, Joseph Gyourko & Raven Saks, Why is Manhattan So Expensive?
Regulation and the Rise in House Prices, 48 J.L. & ECON. 331, 359–360 (2005) (estimating for
the year 1998).
35 Id. at 350–51.
36 The critical issue is that zoning restrictions not only reduce supply of housing but
arguably increase quality and thus demand for housing. Separating out the supply and demand
effects of zoning, therefore, is a tricky business—although several economists have attempted to
tackle the puzzle. See Susan M. Wachter & Man Cho, Interjurisdictional Price Effects of Land
Use Controls, 40 WASH U.J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 49 (1991) (examining “whether the
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Although figuring out the exact costs and benefits is a difficult
task, the political power of development’s opponents makes it highly
likely that single votes on new projects will be more restrictive than
what a more neutral cost-benefit analysis would recommend.
Dispersed interests like renters or new possible residents have little
chance to influence the politics of urban land use decisions when
these decisions are made seriatim, as they have only a small interest
in any one project or down-zoning. This leaves the field to
neighborhood protectionist interests. This is an artifact of the
procedural rules governing land use. Procedural rules that organized
and ordered land use decisions differently likely would produce lessrestrictive results.
There is another reason that land-use politics produces lopsided
results. In other areas with similar interest-group politics, there is
often some kind of outside constraint on distributional legislative
politics. For instance, in budgeting, a legislature’s desire to reward
concentrated interests and short change dispersed ones cannot go on
forever. In normal times, excessive deficit spending will cause a
reaction in the bond market, raising interest rates and depressing the
economy, creating a powerful constraint on profligacy. 37 As James
Carville quipped, “I used to think if there was reincarnation, I wanted
to come back as the president or the pope or a .400 baseball hitter.
But now I want to come back as the bond market. You can intimidate
everybody.” 38 There is no equivalent constraint for zoning decisions:
No bond rating agency will mark a city’s zoning map as “triple-C” or
“junk” because the city has excessively restricted the supply of
housing beyond the efficient level. To be sure, the eventual loss of
housing will impose citywide costs—loss of potential employers or
talented, tax-paying residents—that may eventually prod the city to
liberalize its restrictions. But those constraints are far slower and less
salient than the clear constraint of impending municipal bankruptcy.

increasing price of developable land sites contributes to regionally based housing affordability
problems”).
37 Thomas Friedman’s choice phrase “the Golden Straightjacket,” is probably the cleanest
description of how the need to remain attached to global financial markets checks government
spending. THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE LEXUS AND THE OLIVE TREE 103–33 (rev. ed. 2000). We
do not mean, however, to wade into any debate about deficit spending during a major recession,
just to note that bond markets can check spending.
38 BOB WOODWARD, THE AGENDA 160 (2d ed. 1995).
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B. The Local Legislative Blues: Why Ordinary Legislative Procedure
Cannot Solve the Problem of Land Use
Local land-use politics also lack competition between mass
political parties—the traditional antidote for concentrated interest
groups. Partisan competition between well-recognized party “brands”
can lead local politicians to devise an agenda for zoning reform to
deregulate housing markets. Moreover, such parties can discourage
the sort of mutual (“universalistic”) deference that individual
legislators extend to each other on exclusion of housing—deference
that creates stability in the legislature’s decisions where a strong party
leader is missing. But in many local governments there is virtually no
party competition inside local legislatures or in the population. Thus,
local legislators have little reason to take the risks of deregulating
housing, which would lead to the wrath of neighborhood groups.
The absence of strong political parties in local legislatures can lead
to pervasive NIMBYism because legislatures need some mechanism
to overcome what social choice theorists call the problem of
“cycling” (also known as strategic coordination problems). “Cycling”
problems arise when, under conditions normally regarded as
consistent with—indeed, implied by—norms of democratic fairness,
each member of a collective body composed of members with an
ordinary set of preferences has an unlimited ability to propose and
amend new pieces of legislation. Ken Arrow’s famous finding is that
legislatures applying democratic rules do not necessarily produce
stable outcomes. The result of cyclicng can be either the incapacity to
enact any laws whatsoever or a random determination of winners and
losers. 39
39 As Kenneth Arrow famously showed, there are frequent instances where there is more
than one possible majority on a single issue. KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND
INDIVIDUAL VALUES 22–25 (2d ed. 1963) (proving that in a world with more than two possible
decisions and more than two legislators or other people with the right to vote on the decision,
majority rule can lead to unstable outcomes). That is, a legislature can prefer A to B, B to C, and
C to A, a result generally referred to a cycling. This is because legislators themselves may have
varied preferences—one preferring A to B to C, another preferring B to C to A and yet another
preferring C to A to B. A legislature thus can have unstable preferences, with no one proposal
commanding a majority against all others). Arrow proved that no voting rule that can qualify as
democratic can avoid entirely the problem of cycling, and as the number of alternatives and the
size of the legislature increase, the likelihood of a single majority outcome falls. Id. at 31–33.
For criticism of cycling as a major challenge to democratic practices, see Richard H.
Pildes & Elizabeth S. Anderson, Slinging Arrows at Democracy: Social Choice Theory, Value
Pluralism, and Democratic Politics, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2121, 2127 (1990). There is a longstanding debate about whether the fairness conditions Arrow used are justifiable. For criticism,
see, e.g., WILLIAM H. RIKER, LIBERALISM AGAINST POPULISM 130 (1982); Pildes & Anderson,
supra note 39, at 2146–58. For support, see, e.g., Maxwell L. Stearns, The Misguided
Renaissance of Social Choice, 103 YALE L.J. 1219, 1228 (1994). As we are not using Arrow’s
impossibility theorem for any purpose other than noting that unstable outcomes create
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The remedy for cycling is delegation of agenda-setting power to
some centralized entity: a speaker, committee, party boss, or other
legislative leader. 40 Perhaps the most common structure that puts an
end to endless cycling of proposals is party leadership. On one simple
model, the legislature’s rank-and-file members delegate to party
leaders the powers to monitor whether members are cooperating with
the majority party’s agenda, punishing defectors from, and rewarding
those who cooperate with, that agenda. 41 Come election time, this
leadership and the members who remained loyal to its agenda can
take credit for their combined legislative successes (and be held
accountable for legislative failures).
Party leadership solves the problem of multiple equilibrium
results—that is, endless cycling without decisions. Leadership
chooses a voting order that best serves the ends of some subset of the
legislature. Leadership also uses selective incentives, like plum
committee positions or pork, to “whip” wavering members of its
caucus into voting for legislation that serves the collective ends of the
partisan majority. The party “brand” insures that the agenda is
consistent with the interests of the rank-and-file members, because
leaders who cannot produce electoral gains for their coalition will
cease to have a working legislative majority—and thereby cease to be
leaders. 42
The power exercised by party bosses might seem undemocratic—a
relic of cigar-chomping insiders making decisions behind closed
doors in smoky rooms. But delegation of power to party leadership
can make popular democratic control over policy possible. Individual
voters have no incentives to monitor legislators’ behavior closely, and
little ability to determine whether the thousands of votes legislators
take between elections represent their interests.43 The members’

incentives for using delegation, there is little need to weigh in on the debate.
40 See D. RODERICK KIEWIET & MATHEW D. MCCUBBINS, THE LOGIC OF DELEGATION:
CONGRESSIONAL PARTIES AND THE APPROPRIATIONS PROCESS 22–25 (1991) (discussing the
benefits of delegation).
41 See GARY W. COX & MATHEW D. MCCUBBINS, LEGISLATIVE LEVIATHAN 85–106
(Cambridge Univ. Press, 2d ed. 2007) (comparing political parties to cartels). This work builds
on KIEWIET & MCCUBBINS, supra note 40, at 39–55. Cox and McCubbins and John Aldrich
have shown that political parties evolved historically to create a leadership to which agendasetting power could be delegated. JOHN H. ALDRICH, WHY PARTIES? 28–65 (1995); COX &
MCCUBBINS, supra note 41, at 115.
42 See COX AND MCCUBBINS, supra note 41, at 125–135 (discussing the incentives of
those seeking party leadership); KIEWIET AND MCCUBBINS, supra note 40, at 39–55 (discussing
the extent to which party leaders tend to represent the caucus as a whole).
43 For the classic treatment of this point, see ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY
OF DEMOCRACY 238–76 (1957); see also Neal Devins & Ilya Somin, Can We Make the
Constitution More Democratic?, 55 DRAKE L. REV. 971, 992–99 (2007) (considering how the
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delegation of agenda control to party leadership gives voters a chance
to express their preferences about the overall performance of one
highly visible coalition marked by a distinctive “brand label”—that is,
the party.
Monitoring a party retrospectively based on the overall state of a
city is much easier than monitoring dozens of obscure legislators
voting on hundreds of obscure bills. 44 The public’s “party brand”
votes may not result in voting that is consistent with perfect
information. But party control of legislatures (and party names
appearing on the ballot) is the only thing that makes it possible for a
poorly informed electorate to use issues when voting at all. 45 The
party’s necessary recourse to popular support provides some check on
the influence of particularistic groups. The need to promote a
jurisdiction-wide brand pushes legislators to support legislation that
promotes more general (or at least not exclusively particularistic)
interests. Mass electoral competition, when it works, serves as a
check on the ability of interests groups to dominate politics. 46
In urban legislatures, however, strong party leaders are often
missing, destroying the capacity of the legislature to set its own
agenda according to some overall vision of the jurisdiction’s interest.
There are many reasons for this absence of partisan control. A
majority of urban elections, for instance, are non-partisan. 47 In nonproblem of political ignorance in voters affects the actual prospect of altering the Constitution to
make it more democratic).
44 See DOWNS, supra note 43, at 238–76 (arguing that voting decisions are shaped by the
policies that the government made during the voting period). Further, as Morris Fiorina has
argued, party brands that are consistent over time and available on the ballot make it easier for
voters to use both prospective and retrospective evaluations. MORRIS P. FIORINA,
RETROSPECTIVE VOTING IN AMERICAN NATIONAL ELECTIONS 89–106 (1981). In Fiorina’s
account, voters can develop “running tallies” of their retrospective evaluations of party
performance across time, adding to it whenever they notice something new. Id. These tallies can
be used when it comes time to vote and, particularly across an electorate, will produce voting
patterns that roughly translate issue preferences into votes, even if voters lack much specific
knowledge of politics. Id.
45 For a discussion of assessments of whether clear party heuristics make voters behave as
if they were informed, see David Schleicher, What If Europe Held an Election and No One
Cared?, 52 HARV. INT’L L. J. 109, 143–44 (2011).
46 See COX AND MCCUBBINS, supra note 41, at 127–35 (arguing that political parties help
to prevent electoral inefficiencies). E.E. Schattschneider’s comparison between party politics
and “pressure politics” remains the classic treatment of this point. E.E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, THE
SEMISOVEREIGN PEOPLE: A REALIST’S VIEW OF DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 46–59 (2d ed. 1975).
One of its choicest observations is that pressure groups like the Chamber of Commerce or labor
groups are like firms facing a monopsonist: “Republican critics of the Democratic party like to
portray the Democratic party as the slave of organized labor. Actually, labor usually has no
place else to go. As long as it thinks that elections are important, it must support the Democratic
party, generally. . . . If there are twenty thousand pressure groups and two parties, who has the
favorable bargaining position?” Id. at 56.
47 Karen I. Chang, Note, The Party’s Over: Establishing Nonpartisan Municipal Elections
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partisan elections, voters are denied the one piece of information
about policies that is most useful: a party brand on the ballot. Absent
information about policy stances through information about parties,
voters use whatever information they can get their hands on, usually
ethnic, racial, and status variables. 48 Incumbency status, the personal
networks of candidates, and political interest groups take on outsized
influence in such a political environment. The absence of party
competition enhances the degree to which urban political conflict is
formless and thus provides little check on the power of concentrated
groups in politics. 49
The absence of organized political party competition also renders
non-partisan legislatures harder to organize. Leadership cannot be
trusted to organize votes in a way that will maximize the gains to their
partisan “brand” because there are no competitive parties
differentiated by ideology. The absence of party brands makes it more
difficult for voters to monitor political behavior and thereby reduces
the need for politicians to promote generally beneficial policies.50 The
absence of ideological political party brands, in short, increases the
power of concentrated groups.
Cities with partisan elections are better on this score. But even
those elections are not generally as competitive as state legislative
and congressional elections. As one of us has argued, local partisan
in New York City, 11 J. L. & POL'Y 579, 579 (2003).
48 Gerald C. Wright, Charles Adrian and the Study of Nonpartisan Elections, 61 POL. RES.
Q. 13, 13 (2008) (“In these types of contests, researchers have found that voters rely on a wide
variety of cues, including race, ethnicity, familiarity, place, prestige, religion, and even ballot
location.”); see also Carol A. Cassel, Social Background Characteristics of Nonpartisan City
Council Members: A Research Note, 38 W. POL. Q. 495, 500 (1985) (showing the prevalence of
high occupational status in the council constituency of nonpartisan areas); Joel Lieske, The
Political Dynamics of Urban Voting Behavior, 33 AM. J. POL. SCI. 150, 154 (1989) (discussing
the importance of racial characteristics in nonpartisan elections); Brian F. Schaffner et al.,
Teams Without Uniforms: The Nonpartisan Ballot in State and Local Elections, 54 POL. RES. Q.
7, 8 (2001) (examining the effects of nonpartisan elections on voter decision-making patterns).
49 See Wright, supra note 48, at 15 (“Where . . . legislative organization does not pivot
around party affiliations, conflict is diffuse, with coalitions changing from one issue to the
next.”); Gerald C. Wright & Brian F. Schaffner, The Influence of Party: Evidence from the State
Legislatures, 96 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 367, 377 (2002) (arguing that non-partisanship undermines
the possibilities of popular control of government).
50 A study by Gerald Wright and Brian Schaffner of the unicameral Nebraska legislature,
which is elected on a non-partisan basis, shows this effect. Wright & Schaffner, supra note 49,
at 370–77. Despite the formally non-partisan nature of these elections, almost all Nebraska
legislators are affiliated with one party or another prior to their election and candidates from
each party express very different answers to questionnaires about ideological political issues
(i.e., Republicans give more conservative answers, Democrats provide more liberal ones). Id. at
371. However, when they get to the legislature, neither ideological stances nor their party
membership has as an effect on voting patterns. Id. at 373. Instead, legislators form new and
unpredictable coalitions for each issue. Id. Voters cannot police these random voting patterns
and the lack of organization in the legislature makes cycling more likely.
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elections feature the problem of partisan “mismatch.” 51 While our
major national political parties now consist of relatively ideologically
coherent coalitions, there is little correlation between beliefs about
national issues and beliefs about local issues. 52 But big city voters
rely heavily on national partisan labels—Democratic and
Republican—when making voting decisions. Local elections,
particularly those for non-mayoral offices, often end up selecting
candidates who are representative of local voters on national issues,
but not on local ones. 53
Partisan big city local elections, outside of some mayoral elections
and a few cities in which national party preferences are relatively
equal, are not competitive. Local legislatures in partisan cities often
look like they do in non-partisan cities, except that everyone is a
Democrat instead of being unaffiliated. 54 Frequently, the only election
that matters is the Democratic primary. However, a primary is just
51 See Schleicher, supra note 45, at 114 (describing the problem as a “mismatch”); David
Schleicher, Why Is There No Partisan Competition in City Council Elections?: The Role of
Election Law, 23 J.L. & POL. 419, 422–25 (2007) (discussing the lack of competition in local
elections).
52 See Fernando Ferreira & Joseph Gyourko, Do Political Parties Matter? Evidence from
U.S. Cities, 124 Q. J. ECON. 399, 400 (2009) (finding no policy differences resulting from which
party wins close mayoral elections); Schleicher, supra note 51, at 440–46 (arguing that “voters’
partisan beliefs do not closely track their beliefs at the local level”).
53 The best explanation for this odd result lies in the interaction between election laws and
voter ignorance. See Schleicher, supra note 51, at 448–60. Most voters know little about
individual candidates, at least below the mayoral level. As a result, they will use the information
available to them, such as the party labels on the ballot, so long as it carries any information
(and national party affiliation surely explains something about local candidates, even if not very
much). Local and state laws guarantee that parties that do well in state elections—the big
national parties—are on the ballot at the local level. See id. As a result, voters rely on the
Democratic or Republican brands despite their basic inapplicability to local issues. This begs the
question of why the local minority party does not propose stances on local issues that would
make it popular, as we would expect a vote maximizing party to do. But state laws require local
parties to use primary elections, and if people join national parties due to their stances on
national issues and those issues do not correlate closely with local issue preferences, there is no
reason to expect the product of local primaries to be consistent on local issues. The local
minority party cannot create a local brand because it is no more ideologically consistent on local
issues than the majority party. Further, laws and party rules make it difficult for voters to switch
back-and-forth between parties between elections, meaning that voters (and crucially candidates
and activists) will not swarm to a potentially competitive local minority party for a local election
alone, as this would make participation in their preferred national party primaries more difficult.
Local-only third parties do not enter either because of the ordinary disadvantages of third parties
in a first-past-the-post election system (voters do not want to waste the votes) and because
voters, activists, and candidates do not want to abandon their national parties only for the
purpose of a local election.
54 There are fewer and fewer cities and counties in which national elections are close. This
is largely the result of the “big sort,” or the increasing close fit between residential preferences
and national political preferences. See BILL BISHOP, THE BIG SORT: WHY THE CLUSTERING OF
LIKE MINDED AMERICA IS TEARING US APART 10 (2008) (describing the increasing magnitude
of political party segregation as illustrated by the decreasing percentage of voters living in
counties with competitive presidential elections).
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like a non-partisan election: There are no party labels on the ballot. 55
Voters turn out in small numbers and are forced to use nonideological variables in making their decisions.56 Thus, partisan city
elections are often not much more ideologically competitive than nonpartisan ones.
Why should the essentially non-partisan character of local politics
matter for land-use regulation? Local legislatures, deprived of the
capacity to control their agendas and their electoral fortunes by
delegating agenda control and electoral “branding” to party
leadership, rely on alternative mechanisms for controlling legislation.
One popular mechanism for managing the legislative agenda is the
universal log roll.
In the absence of some strong party leader, legislators face a
prisoner’s dilemma. 57 Members may prefer that some new
development be sited in their neighborhood over their own
constituents’ objections. But no legislator will vote to allow a new
development in her district unless she can be sure everyone else will
reciprocate by taking their fair share of the housing needed to meet
demand. Political parties would fix a contract to divide up the costs of
these decisions fairly and promulgate the benefits of the overall
bargain. But, in their absence, this prisoner’s dilemma leads each
legislator to block every project, even though allocating a “fair share”
of the undesired uses to each legislator might be a possible Pareto
superior result. Moreover, each legislator votes to support her fellow
member’s efforts to exclude NIMBYs out of fear that, were she to
press for unwanted housing in someone else’s backyard, hers would
be next. The absence of a leader results in legislatures forming
“universal” coalitions: Everyone joins the coalition to protect
everyone else from locally unwanted land uses because there is no
55 See Schleicher, supra note 51, at 461–62 (discussing the similarities between primaries
and nonpartisan elections).
56 New York City produced the reducio ad absurdam version of this tendency in 2009.
John Liu defeated David Yassky in a runoff for the position of city comptroller in an election
where only eight percent of eligible Democratic voters turned out (roughly two percent of
eligible voters city wide). Jennifer Fermino & Maggie Haberman, Boring Battles Leave City’s
Booths
Bare,
N.Y.
POST,
September
30,
2009,
available
at
http://www.nypost.com/p/news/local/boring_battles_leave_city_booths_v5SXfgxFtOnj2mUhw
8tXfL. Despite an intense campaign, almost all observers credit his victory not to any stance on
issues but rather to the organizing capacity of local unions that endorsed him and ethnic voting..
See Azi Paybarah, The New New York Machine, N.Y. OBSERVER (Sept. 30, 2009, 2:24 PM),
http://www.observer.com/5495/new-new-york-machine (discussing labor’s help in propelling
Liu to victory); Gail Robinson, The Runoff Results, GOTHAM GAZETTE (Sept. 30, 2009, 8:32
AM), http://www.gothamgazette.com/blogs/wonkster/2009/09/30/the-runoff-results/ (noting
that the increased presence of Asian American voters aided Liu).
57 See COX AND MCCUBBINS, supra note 41, at 80–84 (describing various versions of the
prisoners’ dilemma and possible solutions).
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leader capable of enforcing a more nuanced allocation of costs and
benefits.
In sum, the absence of party leaders means that individual
legislators cannot take credit for the overall benefits of housing nor
fairly apportion the electoral blame of individual votes to allow more
housing into specific districts. In a Hobbesian legislature where every
member stands and falls by themselves, it is hardly surprising that
each member focuses on narrow local concerns.
C. Why Not Just Have the Mayor Make All Land-Use Decisions?
If having the city council vote on zoning amendments leads to
housing shortages, then why have the council involved at all? In
theory, a city could delegate all of its land-use authority to the mayor
or to some administrative agency full of housing experts and city
planners. In both cases, the executive would represent the whole city
and avoid the inter-neighborhood strategic concerns that this Article
has described.
Delegation to the executive branch has political, informational,
and practical problems. The political problem comes from the
principal-agent problem inherent in delegation. The city council
might be willing to delegate authority to the mayor if they thought the
mayor would come up with a deal that would solve their collective
action problems and serve their interests. The mayor, however, would
have a great deal of difficulty providing council members with any
certainty that she would strike such a deal. Instead, the mayor could
use this power to maximize her own political benefits, or to punish
wayward council members. It is uncertain whether a pure delegation,
absent some method for policing the mayor, would serve the council’s
interests. And it is unlikely that the council would agree to a pure
delegation. (Some degree of delegation, we argue in Sections II.B and
III, would produce benefits for a city council and for the city as a
whole.)
The practical problem is similar. City council members get all
sorts of benefits from being the venue in which land-use disputes are
resolved. For instance, developer groups are among the biggest
campaign donors to New York City Council members, and a difficult
to measure but surely extremely high amount comes from interested
property owners. 58 Getting out of the land-use game would entail all
sorts of costs for council members.
58 See Jonathan P. Hicks, The Council And How It Really Works, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26,
1995, at CY1 (discussing the various sources of campaign donations in New York City Council
elections).
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More importantly, it is unclear that the mayor, or some expert
agency, has the tools to resolve the problems inherent in deciding
whether to approve up-or down-zonings. Mayors are likely to have
certain institutional advantages over city councils in determining
certain land-use questions. For example, a mayor would have a better
understanding of how much the city’s housing stock needs to increase
in aggregate, or how housing decisions integrate with decisions about
how to allocate transportation decisions. That is, the mayor is likely
better at determining the citywide benefits from development.
But the mayor probably lacks one crucial type of information that
council members possess: how costly a new project is for a
neighborhood. Even if land-use decisions are too strict in general, it
should go without saying that not all down-zonings (or all denials of
up-zonings) have a negative economic effect. The nuisance value of a
new development to other properties can exceed its benefits, even
when properly measured. The zoning process should take into
account when a project is really bad for a neighborhood, and hence
not worth the addition it makes to the city’s housing stock. Council
members are in close contact with their constituents, and likely have
some ability to judge when a project is merely disliked and when it is
truly hated. They are thus more likely than citywide mandarins to
have access to information about the intensity of local opposition.
Given the practical and political problems with getting a city
council to delegate power to the mayor, and the difficulty citywide
officials have in determining the intensity of local opposition,
delegation to the mayor is both unlikely to occur and unlikely to
produce optimal results. Another answer is needed.
II. CYCLING LANES: HOW UNCONVENTIONAL LEGISLATIVE
PROCEDURE CAN AID DISPERSED INTERESTS
We suggest that a change in voting procedure could mitigate the
power of neighborhood groups and induce better land-use decisionmaking. By bundling together decisions about the use of land in
different neighborhoods for a single legislative vote, voting
procedures could improve land-use decision-making in two different
ways. First, issue-bundling could reassure members of the local
legislature that they will not be left out of a coalition that seeks to
avoid any share of locally undesirable land uses. To the extent that
legislators fear most the outcome where LULUs are barred from
every neighborhood but their own, issue-bundling might be a
reasonable way to overcome collective action barriers to cooperation
by discouraging strategic opposition to all LULUs. Second, by
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requiring that every down-zoning be paired with an equivalent upzoning, voting rules could pit neighborhoods against each other,
which would mitigate the power of geographically-concentrated
groups. Issue-bundling rules are intended to induce local legislatures
to consider the effect zoning changes have on the overall housing
supply. That concern is widely shared by a city and region’s residents
but not felt particularly intensely by any concentrated geographic
group or vested interest (in contrast to its geographically concentrated
and substantial-invested opponents).
To illustrate the power of issue-bundling procedures, it is useful to
examine them in a context outside land-use law where they have built
up a longer track record. Accordingly, we examine Congress’ use of
extra-legislative issue-bundling in two distinct contexts: (1) the
closing of obsolete military bases under the Base Closure and
Realignment Act (BCRA) 59 by using a commission to package
multiple base closings into a single bill for Congress’ up-or-down
vote and (2) Congress’ use of “fast-track” legislative procedure to
ratify reciprocal reductions of both domestic and foreign tariffs in
treaties negotiated by the President.60
In both cases, the critical element of the procedure was the tying
together of several issues into a single legislative package by an actor
outside Congress that Congress believed it could trust to act
impartially between congressional districts or economic interests. 61
By setting the legislative agenda for Congress “extra-legislatively” 62
in contexts where partisan ideology did not operate effectively, the
executive actor’s issue-bundling accomplished two distinct goals.
First, issue-bundling solved coordination or cooperation problems
between legislators, allowing them to apportion costs between their
districts without fear that any legislator would be left out of a
coalition that avoided the costs entirely. We call this the “costspreading” function of extra-legislative procedure.
Second, executive issue-bundling pitted concentrated interests
against each other, thereby protecting underrepresented dispersed
interests from concentrated interests that might otherwise face no
59

Pub. L. No. 100–526, 102 Stat. 2623 (1988) (codified and amended as 10 U.S.C. § 2687

(2006)).
See infra Sections II.A–B.
As Kiewiet and McCubbins have argued, the difficulty in overcoming the challenges of
monitoring agents tasked with controlling the agenda defines much of Congressional procedure
in all areas. KIEWIET & MCCUBBINS, supra note 40, at 4–17. This is particularly true where they
have chosen some special legislative procedure. Id. at 9–12.
62 The political scientist Lawrence Becker has usefully coined the phrase “ExtraCongressional” legislative procedures. LAWRENCE BECKER, DOING THE RIGHT THING:
COLLECTIVE ACTION AND PROCEDURAL CHOICE IN THE NEW LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 2 (2005).
60
61
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effective opposition. We call this the “conflict-inducing” function of
extra-legislative procedure.
Both of those functions require that, upon being presented with the
executive-defined bundle of issues, Congress gives itself only the
option of voting up or down on the entire package. The executive
definition of the voting agenda and procedure, therefore, is a
substitute for partisan methods of organizing legislatures when parties
are absent as an organizing principle and thus general interests
become vulnerable to agenda manipulation by concentrated interests.
However, delegation of the agenda-setting function depends
critically on insuring that the executive issue-bundler is a faithful
agent of the legislature as a whole. Each process baked in protections
to ensure that the principal-agent problems did not ruin the process.
The success that extra-legislative procedures enjoyed in extremely
difficult political contexts suggests to us that they might have
promising applications in the context of land-use regulation. In each
case, however, Congress tailored the exact procedure to a specific
political context. Although we will draw lessons from these examples,
they do not provide a cookie-cutter set of proposals.
A. Stealing Bases: How the Base Closing Commission Protected
Military Need Against Geographically Concentrated Interests
It is not hard to see why it is politically difficult to close military
bases. Domestic military bases bring enormous amounts of money to
specific towns and states and are thus jealously guarded by the people
elected to represent those places. In contrast, national defense is the
classic public good; it benefits all citizens in a non-rival, nonexcludable manner. 63 As military needs change, so does the need for
bases for its troops. When a current base structure ceases to serve the
military’s interest, we can assume that failing to close it will reduce
the quality of national defense by some marginal amount. This harm
will be felt relatively equally by all Americans. Similarly, the harms
created by wasteful government spending—marginally higher taxes,
higher borrowing costs—are also felt generally.
This creates a bias in the system. For Olsonian reasons, small
groups like residents of individual cities facing severe harms will
lobby more than large groups who each are individually due to
receive only small benefits. But merely because reductions in the
63 See Jeffrey Rogers Hummel & Don Lavoie, National Defense and the Public-Goods
Problem, in ARMS, POLITICS AND THE ECONOMY: HISTORICAL AND CONTEMPORARY
PERSPECTIVES 37, 38 (Robert Higgs ed., 1990) (characterizing a public good as having (1)
nonrival consumption and (2) nonexcludability).
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quality of national defense are felt generally does not mean that
members of Congress are always willing to sacrifice national defense
needs to local needs. Rather, where the issue of base closing is
presented as one of local obstruction against the strong needs of
national defense, Congress usually defers to the country’s military
needs. However, when decisions do not seem militarily necessary or
are somehow politically suspect, Congress members will do
everything they can to protect their districts’ bases.
Thus, one can understand base closing as a strategic problem,
approximating a prisoner’s dilemma. 64 Members prefer to have bases
in their districts, no matter what else occurs. But they also prefer to
have all other bases in the proper place for military purposes, and
prefer having all bases in the best place for military purposes to all
members’ being able to protect their bases. Absent cooperation,
though, each member will protect his or her base—or “defect” in
game-theoretic lingo—and no bases will be closed. Only if members
agree not to protect their own bases can Congress obtain the better
result of all bases being properly located for military purposes. As is
common, the prisoner’s dilemma scenario is usually solved either
through an enforceable bargain between members or through strategic
“tit-for-tat” repeated play. Assuming that the latter was excessively
costly, 65 Congress needed a way to make credible commitments that
base-closing bargains would be kept. Their mechanism for such a
commitment was the BCRA. 66
The BCRA’s story begins with the collapse of the purely
Presidential system of base closing after members of Congress
became suspicious that the President was playing political favorites in
selecting which bases to close.67 In response to distrust for the
64 It is also possible to understand member motivations in a slightly different way. One
might understand members to prefer absolutely to have bases in the best place for the military
needs of the country. If, however, a list of proposed base closings is not based on military
necessity, each member will want to ensure that the base in his or her district is protected. This
creates a “stag hunt” game, and there will be two stable equilibrium results—a “clean” list of
base closings and a situation in which no bases are closed. For a discussion of stag hunt games
and the law, see Richard H. McAdams, Beyond the Prisoners’ Dilemma: Coordination, Game
Theory, and Law, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 209, 220–22 (2009). The order in which the issue is
presented, or the availability of some kind of coordination mechanism, will be crucial for
getting to the “clean” list. As congressional negotiation surely involves a large number of
different payoff matrices, and the solution—the BCRA—can be seen as a coordinating solution
as well as one that fosters cooperation, we will not analyze the issue as a stag hunt separately.
65 “Tit for tat” is unlikely to be a successful strategy in base closing politics because of the
difference between closing bases and opening them. Once closed, there is a substantial fixed
cost (both economic and political) in getting a base reopened, so much so that it rarely happens.
66 See Pub. L. No. 100–526, 102 Stat. 2623 (1988) (codified and amended as 10 U.S.C. §
2687 (2006)) (providing authorization to facilitate the closure and realignment of military
bases).
67 Perhaps the most egregious abuse of the process by the executive branch came in the
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untrustworthy Presidential agent, Congress effectively stopped all
bases from being closed. 68
In short, the first lesson of the base-closing experience is that
delegation to an executive officer requires that the executive agent be
a trustworthy agent of Congress. The second lesson is that Congress
found itself unable to manage base closings through simple legislative
votes, because the usual mechanisms of partisan agenda setting were
absent.
As discussed in Section I.B, a majority of Congress generally
delegates power to their party leaders to create an agenda that serves
the interests of that majority. Because those leaders are interested in
maintaining the quality of the national party “brand,” they protect
general interests against specialized ones to a degree. But in the
1970s, congressional leadership was not up to the task of devising a
“clean” list of base closings. The parties were weaker than they are
today, and straight-ticket voting in the electorate was at an all-time
low. 69 Members, faced with bad outcomes for their district, were

Nixon administration’s effort to use a threatened base closing to win a Senate seat in Rhode
Island. Charlotte Twight, Department of Defense Attempts to Close Military Bases: The
Political Economy of Congressional Resistance, in ARMS, POLITICS AND THE ECONOMY:
HISTORICAL AND CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES, supra note 63, at 236, 258–59. As he was
running for Senate in 1972, then-Secretary of the Navy John Chafee publicly fought to save the
Quonset Point Naval Air Station against a military recommendation that it be closed. Id. at 258.
The Committee to Reelect the President used the issue in television ads. Id. As the station was
not militarily useful, the military wanted to get rid of the project, but waited until after Chafee
was elected to re-propose the closing of the base. Id. at 259.
After years of bickering without actually stopping the Defense Department from closing
bases, Congress rebelled in 1973 after a particularly severe set of closings was proposed.
Representatives from the Northeast made a substantial showing in the rebellion because the
Northeast seemed overrepresented in this set of closures. See BECKER, supra note 62, at 19–20
(describing the circumstances and motivations that led to this rebellion).
68 When the Defense Department proposed a new list in 1976, Congress passed a law that
required the military to provide Congress with notification when a base was even considered for
closure, created a long waiting period before any base could be closed and detailed justifications
for closure. BECKER, supra note 62, at 21–22; Twight, supra note 67, at 244–46. Congress also
required base closings comply with National Environmental Policy Act, which meant that the
military had to prepare Environmental Impact Statements and that closings could be held up in
court for years. Christopher J. Deering, Congress, the President and Automatic Government:
The Case of Military Base Closures, in RIVALS FOR POWER 153, 158 (James A. Thurber ed.,
1996); Twight, supra note 67, at 246. Although the original bill was vetoed, another almost
identical package passed soon after, and was made permanent in 1978. Military Construction
Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 95–82, 91 Stat. 358 (1978). This combination of rules effectively
stopped all military bases from being closed between 1977 and 1988. BECKER, supra note 62, at
21.
69 See Larry M. Bartels, Partisanship and Voting Behavior, 1952–1996, 44 AM. J. POL.
SCI. 35, 44 (2000) (noting the “decline in partisan voting in the electorate in the 1960s and
1970s”); Morris P. Fiorina, Parties and Partisanship: A 40-Year Retrospective, 24 POL. BEHAV.
93, 100 (2002) (describing an all-time low in partisanship in the early 1970’s, as illustrated by
the percentage of party votes in Congress).

1/5/2012 1:33:09 PM

2011]

BALANCING THE “ZONING BUDGET”

109

unwilling to sacrifice for their party leadership, as they were unsure
that their party’s brand would aid them come election time.
Leadership in the House—the body that opposed military control over
base closing most vociferously—did not even try to assemble a baseclosing package and instead backed the legislation that impeded base
closing. 70
Thus, distrust of the executive and lack of organizational
mechanisms in the legislature paralyzed Congress, leading it to
neglect the general interest in closing obsolete bases. The costs of the
neglect of this dispersed interest eventually became painfully clear, as
the absurdity of the bases’ continued existence—like a base created to
protect stagecoaches against Native American attacks and another
that was protected by a moat—was highlighted both by fact-finding
commissions and executive policy entrepreneurs.71 Yielding to these
pressures, Congress enacted a base-closing bill that delegated power
to set the base-closing agenda to a commission. 72
The BCRA delegated to independent Base Realignment and
Closure (“BRAC”) Commissions the task of determining which bases
to close based on an initial list formulated by the armed services and
reviewed by the Secretary of Defense.73 To insure impartiality and
transparency, BRAC Commissions were required to hold hearings
and collect information before deciding whether to disregard entirely
the list or add or delete bases from the list. 74 The BRAC
70 Tip O’Neill, then Majority Leader in the House, was the prime sponsor of the 1976 bill
to gum up the base closing process. BECKER, supra note 62, at 20.
71 For examples of these criticisms, see Base Closings: Everyone Wins, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
10, 1988, at A18 (noting the Utah base that was built to protect stagecoaches); Base Closings at
Last, Some Signs of Progress, POST-STANDARD (Syracuse, NY), July 14, 1988 at A10. In the
waning days of the Reagan administration, Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci, shrugging off
decades of executive reluctance to cede any power for determining which bases needed closing,
and the Chairmen of the Armed Services committees in the House and Senate all agreed to baseclosing legislation delegating power to an independent commission. William J. Eaton,
Negotiators Agree on Bill to Facilitate Closing of Military Bases, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 6, 1988, at
30. The willingness of the President to give up some of his traditional power over base closing,
concern about deficit problems at the time, and the unique politics of Presidential changeovers
created a “unique opportunity.” Id. The timing of the bill was perfect—Congress held the vote
before election day when there was no clear list of bases. Under the deal, the Secretary of
Defense and the Commission would act before Inauguration Day, leaving the new
administration unburdened by the political costs of acting. BECKER, supra note 62, at 28–30.
72 Defense Authorization Amendments and Base Closure and Realignment Act, Pub. L.
No. 100–526, 102 Stat. 2623 (1988) (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. 2687 (2006)). For a full
description of how it works, see DAVID E. LOCKWOOD & GEORGE SIEHL, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., 97–305 F, MILITARY BASE CLOSURES: A HISTORICAL REVIEW FROM 1988 TO 1995
(2004).
73 See LOCKWOOD & SIEHL, supra note 72, at 6. They are generally referred to as Base
Realignment And Closure “BRAC” Commissions, although the act is the Base Closing and
Realignment Act. Id. at 6 n.6.
74 Id.
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Commissions’ final recommendation was forwarded to the President
for approval, subject only to a Joint Resolution of Disapproval by
Congress to be enacted within forty-five days of the President’s
approval of the final list. 75 The Joint Resolution, however, required an
up-or-down vote on all base closures, barring all amendments of the
list. 76 In effect, the Congress was faced collectively with the choice of
either ignoring entirely the general need to close bases or accepting
the package of base closures bundled together by the executive actors
defined in the BCRA.
This procedure was strikingly successful in eliminating bases. 77
The success is directly tied to the structure of process. The law has
effectively two elements. First, it forces Congress to make a single
vote on an entire list of base closings. This stops members from
dissolving the deal by proposing an alternative list, which could
create a cycling problem. Second, it gave an outside group—the
BRAC Commission—the power to define the set of base closings. As
long as the BRAC Commission’s decisions were credible as an
expression of military need, it could solve the coordination problem
faced by Congress by spreading the costs of base-closings over the
entire body in a manner acceptable to a critical mass of Congress.
Id.
Id.
77 The first round of base closings was not rejected by Congress and went into effect.
Melissa Healy, House Vote Spells End for 86 Bases; Closure Clears Last Legislative Hurdle But
Foes File Suit, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 19, 1989, at 1. After some bickering, Congress and President
Bush eventually struck a deal establishing the second commission and institutionalizing the
process in the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101–510, §
2903, 104 Stat. 1808, 1808 (1990), which created three more rounds of base closing in 1991,
1993, and 1995.
However, in 1990, Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney attempted and proposed closing a
number of bases independently, arguing that base closing was an executive function. BECKER,
supra note 62, at 23. Congress rejected Cheney’s proposal, claiming that the bases that were to
be closed were almost all in Democratic districts and the new jobs created were all in
Republican districts. See id. at 23 (emphasizing the partisan nature of base closures based on
geography); LOCKWOOD & SIEHL, supra note 72, at 5 (discussing Congress’s rejection of base
closures due to political inequities and detailing Congress’s suggestion for the creation of the
1990 Commission). There were no new BRAC Commissions in the 1990s after President
Clinton was thought to have gone around the BCRA to protect a California military base, but a
new round was eventually undertaken in 2005. See LOCKWOOD & SIEHL, supra note 72, at 15–
16 (discussing President Clinton’s actions); see also Editorial, Don't Miss This Chance to Shut
Unneeded Bases, NEWSDAY, Oct. 11, 1988, at 58 (explaining the rationale for not closing
bases); Susan F. Rasky, Congress Agrees on Closing Bases But Leaves the Choices to a Panel,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 1988, at A1 (listing the closing dates if Congress did not reject the
Commission’s proposal to close bases).
Each round ended in success, as Congress has not rejected any Commission proposal, and
there is a widespread perception that the Commissions have helped reduce the problem of
having an excessive number of outdated military bases. See Kenneth R. Mayer, Closing Military
Bases (Finally): Solving Collective Dilemmas through Delegation, 20 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 393,
399–401 (1995) (describing steps Congress took to constrain the Commission’s discretion).
75
76
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To ensure that the Commission was a trustworthy agent, Congress
built into BCRA several safeguards such as: (1) substantive criteria
for base-closings; 78 (2) a written record that could be reviewed by
other entities, like the courts and Congress’s auditing arm, the
General Accounting Office; (3) some limited role for political
considerations; 79 and (4) Senate confirmation of the BRAC
Commissioners as well as Presidential consultation with all four
House and Senate party leaders before making nominations to
guarantee partisan balance.80 Congress also ensured that the executive
branch could not politicize the process through the backdoor because
the President was subject to the same restrictions as Congress of
approving or rejecting the proposal as a whole. Allowing the BRAC
Commission to add and subtract bases made it less likely that the
initial list proposed by the Secretary of Defense would contain favors
or punishments for particular members of Congress.
The independence of the Commission also provided Members with
an added benefit. Members could take credit for voting against
individual decisions without imperiling their own reputation or their
party’s reputation on defense matters. Members could testify in front
of the BRAC Commission and make a point of trying to protect their
districts’ bases. More importantly, the losers in front of the BRAC
Commission—the members who had their districts closed—could
vote in favor of the Joint Motion to Disapprove.
What they could not do, however, is engage in any horse-trading
with other members, as it was an up-or-down vote. This meant that
losers each time could engage in symbolic protest without upending
the overall benefits to the country from eliminating military
inefficiencies. Senator Phil Gramm argued from the start that one of
the best features of BCRA was the ability of members to take credit
for opposing the decision of the BRAC Commission in a way that
would not affect the result:
78 Mayer, supra note 77, at 399. Congress included a high level of monitoring of GAO
investigations to minimize deviations from the criteria, and Congress allowed affected
constituencies to review the record as well. Id. at 400.
79 There is substantial evidence that the military took congressional political
considerations and military ones into account in designing its list, a sign that it understood its
role as designing a deal in Congress as much as it was making a neutral assessment. See Steven
G. Koven, Base Closings and the Politics-Administration Dichotomy Revisited, 52 PUB. ADMIN.
REV. 526, 529 (1992) (noting that, for instance, base closings were targeted in less than a
majority of districts).
80 Congress also closely monitored the staff of the Commission, limiting the number of
staffers who had worked for the Department of Defense who could serve or hold specific
positions. Former or current members of Congress were selected to chair the first four
Commissions (the 2005 round was chaired by a Secretary of Veterans Affairs who had
previously been a Senate staffer). BECKER, supra note 62, at 27; see also Mayer, supra note 77,
at 402–03 (detailing membership control).
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[I] come up here and I say, “God have mercy. Don’t close
this base in Texas. We can get attacked from the south. The
Russians are going to . . . attack Texas. We need this base.”
Then I can go out and lie down in the street and the
bulldozers are coming and I have a trusty aide there just as it
gets there to drag me out of the way. All the people . . . will
say, “You know, Phil Gramm got whipped, but it was like the
Alamo. He was with us until the last second.” 81
The structure of the decision making process allowed Congress to
pass laws that served a general interest in national defense against
opposition from geographically concentrated groups (and it was
attractive enough that they did it on five separate occasions). Further,
it did so without forcing the members who represented the areas that
lost to bear the downside risk of actually voting against the interests
of their community.
B. Trade Balancing: Reciprocity and Fast Track as Methods to
Generating Interest Group Support for Reducing Trade Barriers
International trade is considered the classic concentrated-cost
dispersed benefit policy area. 82 It is likely the most widely agreedupon belief in modern economics that tariffs and other trade barriers
are economically harmful. 83 The benefits of removing tariffs,
however, fall relatively equally to all consumers of imports, enriching
everyone a small amount. In contrast, there are entities and groups
that are severely harmed when tariffs are removed, specifically the
firms and workers in industries that compete with imported goods.
While the costs are smaller in welfare terms than the benefits, this
distribution of costs and benefits creates a political problem. Those
harmed by reductions in tariffs or other trade barriers have an
81 Charlotte Twight, Institutional Underpinnings of Parochialism: The Case of Military
Base Closures, 9 CATO J. 73, 92 (1989) (citation omitted).
82 It is so classic that it forms part of the basis for discussing policy in these terms in
Olson’s, Pareto’s, and Schattschneider’s work. See MANCUR OLSON, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF
NATIONS 118–45 (1982) (discussing the common market’s impact on jurisdictional integration
and the increase of foreign trade due to the common market, tariff-cutting agreements, and
falling transport costs); VILFREDO PARETO, MANUAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 379 (Ann S.
Schwier & Alfred N. Page eds., Ann S. Schwier trans., 1971) (describing the calculus of the
protectionist movements); E. E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, POLITICS, PRESSURES AND THE TARIFF
127–28 (1935) (describing the politics behind tariff law); see also MICHAEL J. GILLIGAN,
EMPOWERING EXPORTERS 4 (1997) (discussing collective action barriers to efficient trade
policy).
83 See BRYAN CAPLAN, THE MYTH OF THE RATIONAL VOTER: WHY DEMOCRACIES
CHOOSE BAD POLICIES 69 (2007) (showing that economists overwhelmingly support increased
reductions in trade barriers); see also DOUGLAS A. IRWIN, FREE TRADE UNDER FIRE 4 (3d ed.
2009) (noting that evidence supports the case for free trade).
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incentive to spend resources to fight the reductions, while those who
benefit do not. The political economy of trade, the story goes, is as
slanted towards protectionism as the economic story is in favor of free
trade.
The story, though, has a problem. The United States has approved
dozens of trade deals since the last major outburst of protectionism in
the 1930s and has historically low tariffs and non-tariff trade
barriers. 84 With a few notable exceptions, the United States’ policy
can be described as pro-free trade. If the political economy of trade is
so weighted in favor of protectionism, why are protectionist policies
the exception rather than the rule? One answer to the question lies in
the legislative procedure that governs trade deals. Two procedural
rules have helped determine the shape and speed of American trade
liberalization: reciprocity and fast track.
In the forty years leading up the Great Depression, Congress
regularly increased tariffs and decreased them substantially only
once: in the Underwood Act of 1913, 85 when the Democrats (the
party that was more pro-free trade at the time) controlled both houses
of Congress and the Presidency. 86 Despite its infamy, the SmootHawley Tariff of 1930 87 was merely the last in a generation of
protectionist measures. 88
Notably, trade politics prior to the Great Depression were based in
Congress and involved unilateral decisions to reduce or increase
tariffs. Neither the President nor the concerns of foreign countries
were given particular deference in this area, and as such, there were
only two small trade agreements signed between 1890 and 1930. 89
GILLIGAN, supra note 82, at 1–2.
Pub. L. No. 63–16, 38 Stat. 114.
86 The Underwood Act of 1913 is a classic case of delegation to party leadership. After
President Wilson put an enormous amount of political capital into the fight, including both a
great deal of personal lobbying of Senators and the first Presidential address to Congress in
more than one hundred years, the Democrats drafted the legislation in caucus. GILLIGAN, supra
note 82, at 66. When it came to the floor, it did so under a closed rule, which meant no
amendments could be offered. This allowed a joint vote rather than a series of individual ones,
avoiding potential cycling. Along with a big push from the President, this was enough to allow
the bill to pass, despite intense lobbying by import-competing industries. Id. at 65.
87 Pub. L. No. 71–361, 46 Stat. 590.
88 Its infamy has to do with when it was passed, which was just after the beginning of the
Great Depression. Further, it was the first in a world-wide series of tariff increases. However,
there are reasons to believe that other countries—beset with the same political economy
problems as the United States—would have increased their tariffs anyway. See Douglas A.
Irwin, From Smoot-Hawley to Reciprocal Trade Agreements: Changing the Course of U.S.
Trade Policy in the 1930s, in THE DEFINING MOMENT: THE GREAT DEPRESSION AND THE
AMERICAN ECONOMY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 325, 333–35 (Michael D. Bordo, Claudia
Goldin, & Eugene N. White eds., 1998) (discussing the Smoot Hawley Act and its effects on the
world stage).
89 These were agreements with Cuba and Hawaii. Id. at 331. In a few of the trade bills of
84
85
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After all, the Constitution gives Congress, not the President, the
power to regulate trade.90 Further, viewed solely from the perspective
of economic welfare, there is no reason to link domestic tariff
reduction to foreign tariff reduction. Basic economic theory suggests
that reducing tariffs is good for the country that reduces them. Trade
deals, although now the standard form for liberalization, are an odd
form of agreement, in which countries agree to do something that is
good for themselves only if another country will do the same. As we
will see, the need for reciprocity is based on domestic politics.
When power swung to the more-pro-free trade Democrats in 1932,
they did not merely reduce tariffs as they had done in 1913. Instead,
they passed the Reciprocal Trade Agreement Act (RTAA), which
gave the President the power to enter into agreements with foreign
countries to reduce tariffs unilaterally and without the possibility of
Congressional veto. 91 The tariff reductions would be granted to all
countries given most favored nation status. 92 But the President’s
power was limited: Congress granted the President this power only
for three years, on a renewable basis. 93
The RTAA, which was renewed on a repeated basis until the
1960s, allowed the President to negotiate deals that served to reduce
tariffs somewhat before World War II and then substantially as part of
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”) following the
War. 94 Agreements between 1947 and 1963 did little to effect tariff
rates, although the combination of an absence of increases and
inflation had the effect of reducing ad valorem rates during this
period. The Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (“TEA”),95 however,
further enhanced Presidential power, giving the President the
authority to reduce tariffs across products instead of by trading
concessions on particular products, and allowing him to eliminate
tariffs that were lower than five percent.96 This lead to the so-called
“Kennedy Round” of tariff reductions under the GATT, which

this period, the President was given power to either raise rates in response to foreign increases in
tariffs, or in one bill, to lower them in response to foreign cuts (although this power was never
used.) Id. at 331–32.
90 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
91 Reciprocal Trade Agreement Act, Pub. L. No. 73–315, 48 Stat. 943 (current version at
19 U.S.C. § 1351 (2006)). See also GILLIGAN, supra note 82, at 70–73 (describing factors that
led to the passage of the Act); Irwin, supra note 88, at 325, 338–42 (detailing provisions of the
Act).
92 Irwin, supra note 88, at 341.
93 Id.
94 Id. at 347–48.
95 Pub L. No. 87–794, 76 Stat. 872 (codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 1801–88 (2006)).
96 GILLIGAN, supra note 82, at 76.
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slashed tariffs to the point where they were no longer an important
restriction on trade. 97
One reason why the RTAA and the TEA were so successful in
reducing tariffs is that they empowered the President, who, with his
national constituency, is generally considered more pro-free trade
than Congress. Congress is generally more protectionist because its
members represent discrete areas that are severely harmed by tariff
reduction. And members whose constituents are harmed can horse
trade for more general support.
This, however, merely begs the question of why a protectionist
Congress would agree to empower the President. The answer lies—as
Michael Gilligan argues in his excellent book Empowering
Exporters—in its requirement of reciprocity. 98 Until the RTAA,
exporters had little reason to care about import tariffs. But exporters
desperately wanted to see reduced tariffs abroad, particularly after the
harsh round of tariff increases by countries around the world that
followed the United States’ passage of the Smoot-Hawley tariff in
1930. 99 The RTAA gave the President a tool to achieve this, but the
same tool served to reduce domestic tariffs. The RTAA tied the fates
of exporters to the fates of import consumers, ensuring that there were
concentrated interests in favor of trade deals to combat the
concentrated interest groups opposed to them.
The requirement that the RTAA be reauthorized every three years
helped solve the principal-agent problem inherent in all delegations.
A President who wanted to keep his negotiating authority would only
agree to deals that served the ends of Congress. And the President
would thus negotiate sets of tariff decreases and foreign concessions
that, by picking up enough exporter support to offset import
competing industry opposition, could get majority support in
Congress. Unsurprisingly, renewals of trade authority received
overwhelming support from exporters.100
Thus, instead of simply reducing tariffs only to see them increased
when the pro-trade coalition lost power, the proponents of the RTAA
realized that they needed to change the political economy of trade.
They changed trade politics by creating a linkage between the issues
Id.
Id. at 2–13, 70–78.
99 See Irwin, supra note 88, at 337 (arguing that Smoot-Hawley may have been a trigger
for an international increase in tariffs). There is a long debate about whether the Smoot-Hawley
tariff caused a cascade of retaliatory tariff increases or whether countries merely used SmootHawley as an excuse to do something they had planned on doing regardless of U.S. policy.
100 See GILLIGAN, supra note 82, at 73 (“In each case exporters came out in force to lobby
Congress for the renewals, and, with the exception of the midwar 1943 renewal, the ranks of
exporter lobbyists grew in number each time.”).
97
98
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of groups that were previously treated separately. The RTAA thus
guaranteed a constituency in favor of reduced tariffs with real
political muscle. By controlling the order and shape of trade votes, the
RTAA moved Congress from regularly anti-free trade majorities to
regularly pro-free trade majorities. By the 1960s, both political parties
were pro-free trade, a sign that the structure of free trade votes had
shifted the politics substantially. 101
By 1973, when the next round of GATT trade negotiations began,
United States’ tariffs were so low that they were no longer a major
trade issue. 102 Instead, “non-tariff barriers,” like trade subsidies and
regulations that served to harm foreign exporters, were the biggest
limitations on international trade. 103 These policies came closer to the
core of congressional policy-making and Congress was unwilling to
simply delegate them to the President. Further, exogenous shocks to
American industry like the oil crisis of 1973 and changes in the terms
of trade had made key industries, like steel, automobiles and
electronics, extremely sensitive to import competition. Labor unions,
who had supported the TEA, opposed giving the President new
negotiating power for trade deals. 104 Further, both major parties
were—and remain—divided on trade issues, with substantial
protectionist elements inside each party.
Even so, and despite his weakened political status at the time,
President Nixon requested and received new trade authority in the
form of the Trade Act of 1974. 105 The form of the authority changed,
however. Instead of negotiated cuts being enacted automatically, each
new trade deal would come up for a vote in Congress. However, these
votes would be done on a “fast track” basis, which required an up-ordown vote on the package the President presented to Congress, with
no amendments and no filibuster. The agreements struck by the
President during the Tokyo round of GATT negotiations were
approved in the Trade Agreements Act in 1979 by large margins
using the fast track procedure. 106 All trade deals since 1979—both
regional trade deals like the North American Free Trade Agreement
and the most recent multilateral agreement, the Uruguay Round,

101 See Irwin, supra note 88, at 350 (noting the “bipartisan consensus in support of the
executive trade agreements framework”).
102 GILLIGAN, supra note 82, at 77.
103 Id.
104 Id.
105 Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93–618, 88 Stat. 1978 (codified as 19 U.S.C. § 2101
(2006)); see also GILLIGAN, supra note 82, at 77 (discussing the passage of the Trade Act of
1974).
106 GILLIGAN, supra note 82, at 78.
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which created the World Trade Organization—have used fast track
authority. 107
Fast track was essential to developing the lobby in favor of each of
these deals. Tying the vote for reduced trade protection in other
countries to our willingness to reduce domestic trade barriers serves
as a clear example of extra-congressional procedure. 108 Congressional
leadership has difficulty building a coalition on trade, as the parties
have strong internal divisions on trade issues. By requiring that there
be only one vote, on a package designed by the President in
negotiation with other countries, fast track ensured that exporters
would lobby in favor of trade deals. Had amendments been allowed,
exporters might not lobby against amendments that did not concern
them, like tariff increases. Further, the President’s design of the
package is made with domestic political concerns in mind. For
instance, Robert Strauss, the negotiator of the Trade Agreements Act,
specifically asked for and received concessions on tobacco products
from other countries in order to woo Senators in Kentucky who were
worried about the effect of reduced tariffs on alcohol products.109
Fast track procedure involves delegating to the President the power
to design a package deal that will get a majority in Congress. The
assumption is that the President will negotiate for deals that will bring
on enough exporter support to offset increased import-competing
industry opposition. By barring amendments, fast track ensures that
import-competing industry supporters cannot propose alternatives that
may be more preferred by Congress. That is, it gives agenda-setting
control to the most pro-free trade actor in the system—the
President—on an issue on which cycling would likely result between
various pro-free trade and protectionist preferences.
Further, fast track had many elements that were designed to ensure
that the delegation of power to the President was not abused. First,
like the RTAA, it had to be re-authorized every few years. 110 And,
reserving more authority to Congress, it required Congress to approve
each agreement by a majority vote rather than merely letting
107 See David A. Gantz, A Post-Uruguay Round Introduction to International Trade Law in
the United States, 12 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 7, 22–23 (1995) (discussing the use of the “fast
track” procedure to approve NAFTA and the GATT Uruguay Round agreements); C. O’Neal
Taylor, Of Free Trade Agreements and Models, 19 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 569, 571 (2009)
(same). In 2007, fast track authority (FTA) expired, although deals signed before 2007 will use
the procedure.
108 See GILLIGAN, supra note 82, at 77–85 (discussing reciprocal trade agreements).
109 GILLIGAN, supra note 82, at 78; see also BECKER, supra note 62, at 77–85 (discussing
the effects of fast track authority and arguing that FTA allows legislators more control on an
agreement negotiated by the President).
110 See 19 U.S.C. § 2111(a)(1) (2006) (providing that the President has authority for five
years after the effective date of the act).
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Presidential agreements stand. 111 Also, in 1988, Congress created a
procedure to revoke fast-track authority quickly through simple
majority votes. 112 Congress decided to hold mark-up sessions on trade
deals, which allows them to add side-deals that do not change the
terms of the agreement, but does allow Congress (and the President)
to pay off certain members for their support.113 These methods
ensured that the President negotiates deals that actually will receive
majority support in Congress. The President has agenda-setting
authority, but cannot abuse it because Congress is watching very
closely.
Free trade is the classic policy area where the ability of
concentrated interests to lobby is supposed to defeat more general
interests in low tariffs. The United States, however, has very low
trade barriers. One central reason for this is extra-congressional
procedure, specifically delegating to the President the power to
negotiate deals that balance exporter support against importcompeting industry opposition in a way that will get through
Congress. It serves as an example of how such procedure can be used
to create majorities through enlisting interest groups into fights in
which they otherwise might not engage in.
III. CAN LAND-USE BENEFIT FROM EXTRA-LEGISLATIVE
PROCEDURE?
The stories of base closings and reciprocal trade agreements
suggest that extra-legislative procedures can play a critical role in
controlling concentrated interests. Are there any lessons here for landuse regulation and its apparent need to control the power of
neighborhoods to defeat a dispersed interest in housing? We think
that extra-legislative procedures not only could play but have already
played an important role in solving coordination problems in local
legislatures as well as insuring that geographically concentrated
interests do not go unchallenged.
As we note in Part III.A.1, the idea of using extra-legislative actors
to bundle zoning issues is at the core of so-called “fair share”
methods for apportioning affordable housing or other locally
undesirable land uses (“LULUs”) among different communities. Such
“fair share” systems of decision making are essentially similar to the
base-closing commission’s bundling of base closings for an up-ordown vote of Congress. Agencies like the Council on Affordable
111 GILLIGAN,
112 BECKER,
113 Id.

at 83.

supra note 82, at 78.
supra note 62, at 82.
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Housing (“COAH”) in New Jersey enforce “fair share” rules in much
the same way as the base-closing commission enforced criteria for
base closing—as a mechanism for coordinating members of the
legislature by spreading the costs of LULUs in an even-handed way
over members’ districts. 114
Taking a cue from the “fast-track” method of bundling domestic
and foreign tariff reductions, we offer a second form of extralegislative zoning procedure in Part III.A.2—the bundling of up- and
down-zoning proposals to prevent the net reduction of a jurisdiction’s
“zoning envelope.” To our knowledge this second procedure has not
yet been used by local governments. But it has some of the same
advantages of executive bundling in the context of free trade. It would
delegate to the planning commission—an administrative body under
the mayor’s control—the task of tying together restriction and deregulation of housing, thereby pitting neighborhoods against each
other that seek to shrink the zoning envelope. If the legislature can
effectively commit itself to voting for the bundle of regulatory and
deregulatory proposals as a package on a single up-or-down vote,
then neighborhood groups will be arrayed on both sides of the
proposal, as neighborhoods slotted for up-zonings will thereby
become enlisted in the fight against down-zonings.
In Part III.B, we refine our idea of matching down-zonings with
up-zonings. We propose that the device of “housing impact
assessments” designed by the planning commission to bundle downzonings with up-zonings could be an effective and legally acceptable
way to force the legislature to consider the dispersed interest in
locating housing in the most appropriate neighborhood rather than
simply excluding housing altogether.
A. “Fair Share” and “Zoning Budgets”: Protect Dispersed Land-Use
Interests Through Legislative Procedure
Consider, first, how two different zoning procedures—one old and
familiar, and one novel and untried—bear a close analogy to the
issue-bundling in base-closing and tariff treaties. The first is the “fair
share” procedure, used under the Mount Laurel doctrine and the New
Jersey Fair Housing Act, 115 which involves a judicial or executive
agency creating a package of “up-zonings” that become the default
114 See

infra Part III.A (discussing the New Jersey “fair share” process).
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27D–305(a) (West 2010) (establishing the New Jersey Fair
Housing Act); S. Burlington Cnty. N.A.A.C.P. v. Twp. of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713, 727–28
(N.J. 1975) (mandating that New Jersey communities must adequate amounts of all categories
of housing).
115 See
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rule for allocating affordable housing among different New Jersey
communities.
The second is “the zoning budget,” a procedure of our own
invention. It consists of a requirement that the planning commission
recommend disapproval of any down-zoning unless it is matched with
an up-zoning of equal magnitude. We argue that “fair share” is a
species of the “cost-spreading” procedures of which the base-closing
commission is an example—a device by which legislatures can
overcome coordination and collective action problems. The zoning
budget is a species of “conflict-inducing” legislative procedures of
which the “fast-track” procedure for reciprocal tariff treaties is an
example. Like “fast track,” the “zoning budget” has the advantage of
pitting well-organized interests against each other in the interests of
finding the ideal location for new housing.
1. “Fair share” Requirements as a Cost-Spreading Extra-Legislative
Procedure
“Fair share” requirements are most familiar from the Mount Laurel
litigation in New Jersey. 116 Starting in 1975, the New Jersey Supreme
Court construed the state constitution to require that each local
government in New Jersey accommodate its fair share of the regional
need for affordable housing in its zoning ordinance. 117 To calculate
each counties’ share, the Mount Laurel II Court held in 1983 that
three lower state courts, using experts in urban planning, would
devise formulae for apportioning the regional need for affordable
housing by calculating each community’s share of its region’s land,
employment, substandard housing, and population. 118 In the New
Jersey Fair Housing Act of 1985, the New Jersey legislature delegated
this apportioning function to a statewide agency, the Council on
Affordable Housing (“COAH”). 119 A twelve-person agency appointed
by the governor with the advice and consent of the state Senate,
COAH has detailed statutory guidelines and procedures by which to
calculate each community’s share of the regional need. 120 COAH’s
certification of a community’s land-use plan and zoning resolution

116 See Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d at 733 (discussing “fair share” and its implications); S.
Burlington Cnty. N.A.A.C.P. v. Twp. of Mount Laurel (Mount Laurel II), 456 A.2d 390, 422
(N.J. 1983) (discussing the requirements for a New Jersey municipality to meet its “Mt. Laurel
obligations”).
117 Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d at 727–28.
118 Mount Laurel II, 456 A.2d at 489–90.
119 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27D–305(a)–(b).
120 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27D–307 (providing the duties of the COAH).
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creates a rebuttable presumption that the community satisfies the
constitutional requirements of Mount Laurel. 121
It is not hard to see how COAH’s bundling of different
communities’ “fair share” obligations into a single statewide plan
solves a coordination problem in the state legislature. The
concentration of poverty and substandard housing in a handful of
dilapidated and near-bankrupt cities like Camden and Newark has
costs for the state, in terms of peer effects depressing employment
and school performance. To avoid these peer effects, each New Jersey
citizen might prefer that every New Jersey local government,
including their own local government, forgo their power to exclude
all such housing from their territory. The worst possible world,
however, would be that in which one’s own community allowed
affordable housing while every other community did not. In that case,
the peer effects of concentrated poverty would remain. But the nonexclusive community would bear any fiscal or social costs of hosting
low-income households. Because monitoring of other communities’
zoning behavior is costly, local governments acting individually
might adopt a position of total exclusion.
The state legislature could attempt to apportion low-income
households among communities. But each legislator would be
tempted to adopt standards that would exempt as much as possible
their own electoral district from such an obligation. Assuming that the
limits on local zoning authority would be complex, the possibilities
for log-rolling to thrust housing obligations on different areas of the
state are legion. If the leadership of the major political parties did not
take any clear position on how affordable housing should be
apportioned, then instability in the legislature might lead to the
legislature’s simply refusing to address the issue of zoning. That
appeared to be the state legislature’s approach before the New Jersey
Supreme Court forced the legislature to confront the issue.122 After
Mount Laurel II seemed to threaten each local government with a
judicially calculated “fair share” of housing, the state legislature
delegated definition of the “fair share” to the COAH, consisting of a
mix of developers, housing advocates, and suburban mayors. 123
Why did the state legislature transfer responsibility for enforcing
Mount Laurel from the courts to an executive agency? The obvious
answer is that the legislature and governor have greater collective
control over COAH than over the courts. Justices serve seven-year
121 N.J.
122 See

STAT. ANN. § 52:27D–317.
Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d at 740–41 (describing the state of housing in New Jersey

as a crisis).
123 See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 52:27D–305(a) (establishing the COAH).
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terms, subject to Senate confirmation and gubernatorial reappointment, but strong norms favoring re-appointment of justices
give the court substantial—albeit not complete—independence from
the political branches.124 Moreover, the court need not contain
representatives of suburbs and central cities, nor need it be balanced
among the two major political parties. There is a danger, therefore,
that the court might not be a faithful agent of the entire legislature.
By contrast, COAH’s members must include both big city and
suburban elected officials as well as equal numbers of Republicans
and Democrats. 125 COAH, therefore, poses less of a risk that it will
disregard the interests of any region or party within the legislature.
And because COAH owes its very existence to the state legislature, it
is more amenable than the state supreme court to anticipating and
adopting likely legislative reactions to “fair share” calculations.126
Perhaps as a result, COAH’s estimates of regional needs for
affordable housing have been persistently criticized by advocates of
affordable housing as too low. 127 This criticism, however, hardly
indicates that COAH has fallen prey to the parochial forces that it is
supposed to supersede. Instead, it might be that the median legislator
in the New Jersey state legislature believes that the amount of
affordable housing necessary to avoid the costs of excessive zoning
restrictions is much lower than the preferences of housing advocates.
In effect, the COAH operated as an impartial and transparent agent
for the legislature, spreading the costs of affordable housing in ways
that avoid a scramble among legislators to form unstable burdenshifting coalitions.
COAH is not unique; The City of New York has used a roughly
analogous method for apportioning LULUs among boroughs to insure
that low-income neighborhoods do not have to bear more than their
124 See Richard Perez-Pena, Christie, Shunning Precedent, Drops Justice From Court,
N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2010, at A22 (discussing New Jersey Governor Chris Christie’s decision
not to reappoint New Jersey Supreme Court Justice John E. Wallace Jr., the first time a New
Jersey Governor had exercised that power in 63 years).
125 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27D–305(a)–(b).
126 Because the agency’s assessments of regional need may have been too aggressive for
New Jersey localities, local governments have recently pressed for COAH’s elimination, a
demand that recently elected Governor Chris Christie seems eager to satisfy. See Lisa Fleisher,
Gov. Chris Christie Proposes Eliminating Affordable Housing Quotas, Fees, N.J.COM (May 13,
2010,
7:44
PM),
http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2010/05/gov_chris_christie_proposes_el.html) (“‘This is
about getting Trenton the hell out of the business of telling people how many units they’re
supposed to have . . .,’ Christie said. ‘We need to lift that wet blanket off of the municipalities
and put the people who were elected back in control of making these decisions.’”).
127 See, e.g., DAVID L. KIRP ET AL., OUR TOWN: RACE, HOUSING, AND THE SOUL OF
SUBURBIA 140 (1995) (arguing that the COHA was set up as an agency that the legislature
could control).
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“fair share” of noxious facilities like bus depots. As in New Jersey,
the city charter delegates the task of working out criteria for siting to
an agency—New York City’s Planning Commission—while the
implementation of the criteria is given to various exceutive agencies
in charge of different categories of LULUs. 128
There is one salient difference between the COAH and the baseclosing commission: The state legislature is not bound to vote up-ordown on the COAH’s package of “fair share” decisions but instead
could amend that package simply by amending the New Jersey Fair
Housing Act of 1985. The state legislature, however, has, as a general
matter, not revised COAH’s rules in an ad hoc manner, preferring
instead to stay out of the housing fray even when loudly criticizing
COAH’s performance. 129 Instead, the state legislature has used the
cruder mechanism of threatening not to re-appoint judges or council
members to keep COAH in check. 130 The great virtue of these general
128 See N.Y.C. CITY CHARTER § 203 (2004) (requiring the City Planning Commission to
adopt criteria “to further the fair distribution among communities of the burdens and benefits
associated with city facilities . . . .”).
129 This is not to say that the legislature has never intervened to strengthen the Mount
Laurel obligations. In 2008, for instance, the state legislature intervened to abolish regional
contribution agreements and to require COAH to accommodate the needs of very low-income
households—those earning less than thirty percent of the area median income. See N.J. REV.
STAT. § 52:27D–304 through 320 (2008). For a brochure celebrating the 2008 amendment,
popularly known as “A-500,” as a strengthening of the Mount Laurel doctrine, see Fair Share
Housing Center, “Separate Is Never Equal” (available at http://fairsharehousing.org/pdf/A500_Brochure.pdf). In 2010, the New Jersey legislature considered a bill, designated A-3447, to
adopt a simplified version of the “fair share” obligation that would have reduced municipal “fair
share” obligations and was, therefore, opposed by the supporters of the Mount Laurel doctrine.
See
2010
N.J.
LAWS
A-3447,
available
at
http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/2010/Bills/A3500/3447_R1.PDF. For a description of opposition to
A-3447, see Fair Share Housing Center, Summary of November 8, 2010 version of A-3447, as
amended (posted by Adam Gordon on November 10th 2010), available at
http://fairsharehousing.org/blog/entry/summary-of-november-8-2010-version-of-a-3447-asamended/; Fair Share Housing Center, Why A-3447 is “a failure” and how to make it work
posted
by
Adam
Gordon
on
November
11th
2010,
available
at
http://fairsharehousing.org/blog/entry/why-a-3447-is-a-failure-and-how-to-make-it-work/. After
the bill was amended by supporters of the Mount Laurel doctrine, Governor Chris Christie, an
avowed opponent of the doctrine, vetoed it as an insufficient reduction of municipal “fair share”
obligations. See Colleen O'Dea, Affordable Housing Reform: The Controversy Continues,
NJSPOTLIGHT,
February
25,
2011
available
at
http://www.njspotlight.com/stories/11/0225/0029/. Thus, no bill has succeeded in reducing
Mount Laurel obligations as a general matter, let alone reducing specific municipalities’
obligations.
130 Chief Justice Wilentz authored an opinion upholding the New Jersey Supreme Court’s
decision upholding the New Jersey Fair Housing Act of 1985 handed down on February 20th,
1986, shortly before the New Jersey senate confirmed the re-appointment of Chief Justice
Wilentz on July 31, 1986. See Hills Dev. Co. v. Bernards Township, 510 A.2d 621 (1986).
Opponents of Mount Laurel placed intense pressure on Governor Kean not to re-appoint
Wilentz because of his role in creating the Mount Laurel doctrine, and Wilentz was confirmed
on a narrow vote after the last-minute switch from a senator from suburban Cherry Hill. See
DAVID L. KIRP, JOHN P. DWYER, LARRY A. ROSENTHAL, OUR TOWN: RACE, HOUSING, AND
THE SOUL OF SUBURBIA 142–44 (1997). Shortly after his confirmation by a narrow vote in the
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control mechanisms is that they avoid the collective action problem
that fine-tuned amendments of “fair share” rules would create. Given
this legislative self-restraint, both the courts and the agencies are
well-suited to act as coordinating devices for resolving collective
action problems faced by the state legislature.
Why have individual members of the state legislature not
attempted to tinker with the package of “fair share” calculations
handed down by either COAH or the courts? One reason might be
that the apparent neutrality of COAH’s procedures and decisions
provide political cover for individual legislators similar to that
provided by the base-closing commission. Just as Senator Phil
Gramm can win plaudits from his constituents by threatening to lay
down in front of the bulldozers to stop them from destroying a
military base, so too, individual legislators can rail against COAH
while refraining from rolling logs to unravel COAH’s bundles of “fair
share” calculations. In this sense, COAH’s calculations are selfenforcing because they provide a salient focal point on which
legislators can avoid eternal cycling. No one wants to disturb the
norm of having some number of Mount Laurel units thrust upon one’s
suburb by the agency for fear that the alternative would be the
instability of ever-shifting regional coalitions of legislators trying to
shift the burden of affordable housing on to their neighbors.
2. Maintaining a “Zoning Budget” by Offsetting Down-Zoning with
Up-Zoning
COAH’s packaging of multiple up-zoning decisions into a single
bundle solves a collective action problem faced by a state legislature
that lacks strong partisan leadership on the question of siting
affordable housing. However, a legislative rule designed to increase
housing generally has to defeat the general preferences on the part of
all homeowners for increased housing. We offer a second sort of
extra-legislative procedure as a way of not merely solving
coordination problems in the legislature but also inducing conflict
among well-organized interest groups. We call this proposal “the
zoning budget balance bill.”
As with other extra-legislative procedures, our proposal begins
with a delegation of agenda-setting power to some administrative
agency—most plausibly, a city’s planning commission. The planning

state senate, although correlation is not causation, it is difficult to believe that the senate’s
opposition to Mount Laurel and Chief Justice Wilentz’s re-appointment had no effect on the
Court’s decision to defer to the state legislature’s implementation of the Mount Laurel doctrine.
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commission would be charged with setting an overall annual zoning
“budget” for the city consisting of the optimal increase (or
theoretically, a decrease) in the number of housing units within the
city or the number of potential units permitted by the zoning
envelope. The planning commission would also be charged with
devising a ratio of up-zonings to down-zonings in light of its zoning
“budget.” So long as the city’s housing stock (or zoning envelope)
fell below this housing target, the planning commission would
prohibit map amendments reducing the number of housing units
unless those amendments were matched at some set ratio by an upzoning elsewhere. If the budget was positive, this ratio would have to
be above one, so that each approved down-zoning would result in
more housing. The ratio would apply until sufficient new projects had
been approved to meet the number called for in the budget. After that
point, all down-zonings or denials would be offset at a ratio of one to
one. This package would be voted on, up or down, by the local
legislature, subject to a closed rule, just like “fast track” for trade
deals.
Once the budget was passed, the law would establish a procedure
for considering zoning changes. For each proposed map amendment
re-zoning city land, the agency would present a package of down-and
up-zonings to the local legislature. The legislature would be required
to accept or reject the entire package without uncoupling the two
decisions (the package would include as many up-zonings relative to
down-zonings as are called for in the ratio adopted in the budget).
Supporters of a down-zoning—typically, neighborhood activists
seeking to preserve community character—would be forced to
identify and defend a potential and suitable up-zoning in some other
neighborhood, transforming the opponents of new building into
advocates. Likewise, the residents of that alternative neighborhood
would have an incentive to lobby for maintaining housing in the area
of a proposed down-zoning, by pointing to the relative unsuitability of
their own area for more housing. The zoning budget would enlist
interests that normally fight against housing proposals to lobby for
housing in competing neighborhoods. The idea would be roughly
analogous to “pay-as-you-go” budget rules designed to force
advocates of new spending programs to identify cuts in other
spending programs that would eliminate the budgetary effects of the
new proposed spending. 131 By pitting interests against each other,
131 See generally Elizabeth Garrett, Harnessing Politics: The Dynamics of Offset
Requirements in the Tax Legislative Process, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 501, 510 (1998) (describing
“PAYGO” and its goals).
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such rules insure that the relative merits of the interests’ rival
proposals are brought to the legislature’s attention.
Such a proposal might have some of the same conflict-inducing
features as a “fast track” procedure allowing the President to bundle
together domestic and foreign tariff reductions. In that case, exporters
become advocates for reducing domestic tariffs not because they care
about consumers but merely because they want to obtain access to
foreign markets. Under the zoning budget model, the residents of
neighborhoods proposed for up-zoning would lobby to preserve
housing opportunities elsewhere, while the residents seeking a downzoning would lobby for expanded housing in the former residents’
neighborhoods.
This could work to create a permanent coalition in favor of an
increased housing stock. Developers would be given new allies,
specifically the communities most interested in down-zonings, who
would lobby together and hence create a powerful coalition in favor
of new projects. It would also ensure competition among downzoning projects, with council members’ willingness to fight for their
projects serving as a proxy for the true value of a down-zoning. 132
Further, as the matching procedure would provide a political outlet,
the system as a whole would be at least modestly secure against truly
unpopular denials of down-zonings.
The analogy to “pay-as-you-go” budgeting, however, suggests an
immediate difference between reciprocal trade agreements and
proposals to link down-and up-zonings. Like budgeting, the proposed
zoning procedure might be easily waived by the very legislature that
it is supposed to constrain. There is a causal and temporal relationship
between foreign and domestic tariff reductions; exporters cannot get
the benefit of the former without the latter, regardless of how
Congress votes, because foreign governments will not give the United
States something for nothing. It would, therefore, be impossible for
exporters to sever the foreign from the domestic tariff reductions and
lobby just to obtain the former, ignoring the latter.
132 This only works if the competition is a function of a councilmember’s willingness to
fight and not of some other difference, like the political influence of residents. For this to work,
some mechanism would have to be created to ensure that the process did not result in matching
down-zonings of high value properties with up-zonings in politically-weaker poorer areas.
Another problem that could arise would be if up-zoning were proposed in areas that were not
suitable for new housing. One solution to these problems would be a rough “like for like”
requirement, under which the planning commission could only offset down-zonings with upzoning in areas where likely development would result in housing of roughly the same value as
the down-zoned housing (say from 50 percent to 150 percent of the value). This would permit
useful trades between down-zoning and up-zonings without permitting phantom offsets or
dumping up-zonings in poor areas.
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By contrast, developers practically can obtain an up-zoning
without lobbying for a down-zoning elsewhere, and, but for the
proposed bundling rule, neighbors seeking a down-zoning need not
obtain an up-zoning. The temptation, therefore, will be great for both
developers and neighbors to lobby the local legislature to waive the
procedural rule whenever it threatens to derail their zoning agendas. If
the rule were routinely waived, then it would not induce neighbors to
lobby for housing; they would, instead, lobby for waiver of the rule.
The challenge of the offset mechanism in our “zoning budget,”
therefore, parallels the challenge of PAYGO budgeting procedures:
There needs to be a rule, norm, or institutional mechanism for
entrenching the bundling of up- and down-zonings. In the following
section, we fill in the details of the “zoning budget” system,
explaining why we believe that this challenge is surmountable.
B. Housing Impact Assessments as a Mechanism for Making the
“Zoning Budget” Credible
In crafting a detailed proposal for a zoning budget, we are guided
by the example of both the base-closing commissions and Presidential
treaty negotiation. In both cases, the institution’s transparency and
credibility as an honest broker for legislative interests can induce the
legislature to refrain from unbundling the institution’s packages of
issues. Likewise, the institution’s capacity to mobilize groups to
support the entire package can deter the legislature from picking apart
the package for the sake of those mobilized groups’ rivals.
The ordinary zoning process in place in most American cities
offers the ingredients for such an extra-legislative bundling process.
The planning staff and planning commission certainly have the tools
to cultivate a reputation for bureaucratic impartiality. The members of
planning commissions typically are appointed by mayors sensitive to
the various real estate constituencies in the city. 133 Further, their
decision making process is transparent. Planning commissions
typically must hold hearings before approving any proposals for
zoning map amendments, and these hearings are generally wellattended when they affect the neighborhoods of persons having an
equity interest in their homes or businesses.
Moreover, standard zoning procedure includes devices for
detecting and airing the views of any mobilized interest group.
133 On the political character of planning commissions, see RICHARD F. BABCOCK, THE
ZONING GAME: MUNICIPAL PRACTICES AND POLICIES 39–40 (1966) (discussing the problems
with planning commissions); RICHARD F. BABCOCK & CHARLES L. SIEMON, THE ZONING
GAME REVISITED 259 (1985) (stating that zoning is a political game).
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Section 5 of the Standard Zoning Enabling Act, for instance, provides
that the owners of twenty percent of the land within some defined
number of feet of a proposed map amendment may protest the
proposal, triggering a requirement that the proposal be approved by a
super-majority. 134 New York City’s Uniform Land-Use Review
Procedure (“ULURP”) requires map amendments to undergo a
gauntlet of public hearings before a community board as well as
planning commission, assuring that politically attentive residents will
register their protests before the proposal reaches the city council. 135
In short, there are numerous fire alarms built into the zoning
amendment process to apprise legislators of substantial community
opposition to any proposal. When the city’s planning staff initiates a
zoning map amendment (usually at the behest of developers or
neighborhood groups), the initial proposal is crafted with an eye to
surviving this gauntlet. Like the President negotiating a package of
tariff reductions, the planning staff and commission craft their
package of zoning proposals with an eye to how it will be received by
the legislature that must ultimately approve it.
Packages of up-zonings and down-zonings should have the same
character. The planning staff should be expected to seek out land for
compensatory residential up-zoning that mobilizes the strongest
interests in defense of the entire package. This would mean land that
contains the weakest neighborhood groups but the strongest
development interests. One would expect such land to be land with
low residential densities but high residential value. For example, old
warehouses in an area that is gradually becoming “hip,” held by
speculators capable of, and interested in, developing the land to
capture this difference in current and future value.
The “zoning budget” process can magnify and direct these inherent
incentives to organize effective coalitions in defense of up-zoning.
We suggest, as an example of such a mechanism, that the planning
staff should be required to submit a “housing impact statement” with
any zoning proposal. The housing impact statement should identify
not only the loss of housing resulting from any proposed downzoning but also the quantity of housing likely to be produced by the
134 DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON ZONING, A STANDARD STATE
ZONING
ENABLING
ACT,
Sec.
5,
at
7–8
(1928),
available
at
http://landuselaw.wustl.edu/StndZoningEnablingAct1926.pdf.
135 See The Uniform Land Use Review Procedure, N.Y. CITY DEP’T OF CITY PLAN.,
http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/html/luproc/ulpro.shtml (last visited Oct. 30, 2011) (outlining the
overall review process for city map and text amendments, including application and hearings);
see also Uniform Land Use Review Procedure Rules, N.Y. CITY DEP’T OF CITY PLAN. (June 27,
1990), http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/html/luproc/ulrule.shtml (describing the rules that need to
be followed concerning applications by residents for text and map amendments).
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proposed up-zoning. Such a statement would identify the developer(s)
likely to propose this new housing, with the expectation that such a
developer would submit plats, site plans, or other documentation
indicating a readiness to develop the land in question. The planning
staff would also identify the reasons why the proposed up-zoning
moved the land to a superior use and why failure to up-zone the land,
when coupled with a down-zoning of another neighborhood, would
endanger the local government’s overall housing goals.
It is likely that the danger that the local legislature would uncouple
the planning staff’s bundle of up-zoning and down-zoning proposals
would emerge only if residents from the two affected neighborhoods
made common cause with each other to resist new development in
either neighborhood. The housing impact statement, however, would
highlight the systemic effect of such resistance and force the local
legislature explicitly to acknowledge abandonment of its own housing
goals. Moreover, the housing impact statement’s assessment that the
proposed up-zoning site was unsuitably zoned would be ammunition
in the hands of the developer seeking to challenge that zoning as a
violation of substantive due process or as inconsistent with the city’s
own comprehensive plan. Such lawsuits seldom succeed before state
courts, in part because the courts are reluctant to second-guess local
officials’ own estimates of the proper timing for implementing the
comprehensive plan.136 The housing impact statement’s specific
recommendation that the land be developed simultaneously with the
down-zoning of other land would neutralize such grounds for
deference.
The threat of judicial review would not, by itself, suffice to lock in
the planning staff’s and commission’s coupling of the down- and upzoning. Instead, the detailed factual findings in the housing impact
statement, the ratification of the zoning-budget procedure by the local
legislature itself, the lobbying by affected developers, and even the
developer’s threat of a lawsuit to challenge down-zoning inconsistent
with the zoning budget, would all induce the local legislature to
characterize the bundling procedure as pre-existing legal standards
the waiver of which would constitute a breach of “rule of law” values.
It is unimportant that the local legislature be sincere in publicly
renouncing such waiver for the sake of legal regularity. The important
point is that the stigma of acting lawlessly would constitute sufficient

136 See, e.g, Marracci v. City of Scappoose, 552 P.2d 552, 553–54 (Or. Ct. App. 1976)
(deferring to city’s finding that property owner’s proposed conditional use was not in best
interests of the city).
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political cover for local legislators to refrain from picking apart the
bundle of up-and down-zoning proposals.
To the extent that this coupling procedure becomes viewed as a
given, exogenous to the political decision, the residents of the
affected neighborhoods will have no choice but to oppose each
other’s proposals rather than join forces to urge the uncoupling of the
planning commission’s bundle of proposals. Each neighborhood
group will argue that the other neighborhood is a more appropriate
site for housing given the infrastructure, market demand, presence of
industry or other nuisances, etc. That lobbying would provide
information to the local legislature not only about the neighborhood
groups’ relative preferences but also their relative levels of political
organization—a critical factor for electorally minded politicians
seeking information about the risks of alternative policies.
This proposal relies on the assumption that mayors and city
planning staff will have a greater desire to promote new housing than
councilmembers. Like the President’s interest in trade liberalization,
mayors tend to have a jurisdiction-wide perspective on the local
government’s needs. Housing shortages that drive up rents and drive
off employers spell trouble for any incumbent mayor running on the
general economic performance of a city, town, or county. The
planning commission tends to reflect the mayor’s agenda, being
mayoral appointees. The planning staff’s incentives in formulating the
citywide goals for a certain number of housing units probably would
not be excessively shaped by neighborhoods, simply because such
abstract proposals do not trigger neighborhood activism. Neighbors’
powers are rooted in their investment in particular places. They face
the same collective action problems confronted by any other group in
trying to mobilize their members to monitor general policy making
not targeted at specific neighborhoods.
As Part I noted, a mayor cannot effectively overcome
neighborhood opposition through sheer brute force of executive order.
Like President Nixon’s base closure decisions, any such power would
run the risk of being used to reward allies and punish enemies in ways
unrelated to city welfare. But trusting the mayor’s planning
commission with agenda-setting power allows the local legislature to
advance dispersed interests without giving up all power to a
potentially untrustworthy agent.
In sum, the planning commission could perform the same role as
the President in tariff negotiations, bundling proposals to assemble
maximum political support. The powers urged for the planning
commission are not remote from the sorts of powers that such
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commissions typically exercise. Environmental impact statements can
and do contain assessments of effects on housing. 137 Extending this
requirement to include the effects of down-zonings as well as upzonings is hardly revolutionary. Likewise, such statements typically
require some reference to mitigation of harmful effects, including offsite mitigation. Including up-zoning proposals as part of such
mitigation is not radically different from including recommendations
of street widenings or traffic lights to mitigate, say, traffic effects.
Planning staff and commissions typically assemble complex packages
of zoning proposals pursuant to planned unit development
ordinances. 138 One can think of the bundle of up- and down-zonings
urged here as an extension of the idea of a planned unit development,
in which open space in one part of the development is offset by
clustered housing elsewhere.
Finally, the idea that zoning ought to be consistent with a
comprehensive plan reflecting the city’s overall development goals is
hardly novel. The idea was embodied not only in the text of the
earliest zoning legislation but also the exhortations of generations of
land-use scholars. 139 The “zoning budget’s” overall housing goal is
merely a specific instance of using citywide goals to discipline
piecemeal neighborhood-by-neighborhood decisions.
Where this proposal differs from past approaches is its underlying
case for such planning and bundling. The point of our proposal is to
realign interest group incentives rather than bring planning expertise
to bear. We hold no illusions that planners are omniscient in their
prescriptions for city development. Instead, we urge a greater role for
executive agencies in agenda-setting simply because such bundles
show promise of inducing interest group conflict that might break the
impasse over enlarging a city’s zoning envelope. Similar mechanisms
have liberalized trade and shut down obsolete military bases. It might
be time to experiment with extra-legislative procedures in zoning
politics.

137 See Chinese Staff & Workers Ass’n v. City of New York, 502 N.E.2d 176, 177 (N.Y.
1986) (holding that environmental impact statements required by state law must assess
gentrification effects of new development).
138 See generally Gerald D. Lloyd, A Developer Looks at Planned Unit Development, 114
U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1965) (identifying the complex political and social considerations about
proposals that have been made for planned unit development).
139 See BABCOCK & SIEMON, supra note 133, at 261 (“The Standard State Zoning Enabling
Act (SZEA), first published in 1924 and ultimately adopted in whole or in part by forty-four
states, provided that zoning shall be made ‘in accordance with a comprehensive plan.’”)
(citation omitted); STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT, supra note 134 (1928), available
at http://landuselaw.wustl.edu/StndZoningEnablingAct1926.pdf.
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CONCLUSION: CAN EXTRA-LEGISLATIVE PROCEDURE SOLVE OTHER
URBAN PROBLEMS?
States bar cities from engaging in policy making on private law
topics—tort and contract law—and limit the taxing power that cities
would need to engage in Pigouvian tax and subsidy policies to
address externalities. 140 As a result, cities rely on zoning and
regulatory exclusion to achieve all sorts of policy goals that would be
more easily and efficiently addressed through ordinary regulatory or
tax policy.
Forcing cities to use suboptimal tools results in worse policy
making. This Article shows that using land use, as opposed to other
regulatory tools, has a political cost as well. Land-use decisions are
often effectively made at the very local level, as it is difficult for
citywide policy makers to get information about local nuisances.
Further, as a matter of practice, local land-use decisions are usually
made one-by-one, rather than as a package. This leads to local
protectionist interests winning to a greater extent than they would in
citywide votes. Unlike subsidies or taxes, which affect a common
budget, regulation through zoning is difficult to observe for outsiders.
And it is made through a procedure that limits interest group
competition in service of common goods.
If regulation through zoning causes similar problems in other
policy areas as it does in housing, something like the proposal we
suggest in this Article could help cities address all sorts of quality-oflife disputes. For instance, a citywide decision on the “budget” for
liquor licenses to hand out and a requirement of matching denials
with new approvals would force local protectionist groups to compete
with one another for keeping the kids out without excessively limiting
the ability of city residents to get a drink. To the extent the goal is to
achieve the “conflict inducing” goal of mobilizing interest groups that
usually take a pass on certain regulatory fights, the specifics of each
proposal would have to be tailored to the interest group alignment that
prevailed on any issue.
But the broader principal remains the same. As there is frequently
a lack of political party competition, legislatures care little about
problems with widely-shared effects because there is no party brand
140 See RICHARD BRIFFAULT & LAURIE REYNOLDS, CASES AND M ATERIALS ON STATE
AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 365–68 (7th ed. 2009) (describing the “private law” exception);

Roderick M. Hills, Jr. & David Schleicher, The Steep Costs of Using Noncumulative Zoning to
Preserve Land for Urban Manufacturing, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 249, 272–73 (2010) (discussing
how tax rules and limits on ability to change private law forces cities to use inefficient means of
subsidizing urban manufacturing).
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to burnish by addressing them. Thus, ordinary legislative procedure
fails to protect general interests. When reformers achieve political
power, as they occassionally do, they should consider developing
special forms of urban legislative procedure that will create stable
coalitions of groups in favor of more widely shared interests. Extralegislative procedure can help balance the dominance of the local and
the parochial in urban politics. And it should become part of the
toolkit of urban reform.

